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Comparing Soviet ties with Cuba and Sandinista-led Nicaragua during the Cold 
War to Russian ties with Cuba and Nicaragua today, this thesis finds that Russia’s 
reengagement with former Soviet allies in Latin America does not portend a return of the 
Soviet “bear” to the U.S. periphery. Daniel Ortega–led Nicaragua and the Castro regime 
in Cuba have indeed again become politically close with Russia and have each developed 
some security and economic ties with Russia since at least late 2008. Their mutual 
political support against Western positions at the UN and Russia’s sporadic naval 
deployments and strategic bomber flights, as well as counter-narcotics cooperation with 
Nicaragua, may seemingly present a notable challenge to the United States in its 
periphery. Yet, Russia’s ties—particularly security and economic ties—with the former 
Soviet allies remain rather narrow and do not present a significant challenge to the United 
States. As such, this thesis recommends that U.S. policymakers not adopt a “red scare” 
mentality about Russia’s reengagement with its Cold War allies. Nonetheless, the United 
States should remain engaged with not only its partners in the region but also with 
Russian allies there to hinder further Russian engagement that may run counter to U.S. 
interests. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In February 2014, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu stated that Russia 
wanted to open military bases in Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela, and some countries in 
Asia.1 After Shoigu’s subsequent visit to those Latin American countries in February 
2015 to make agreements for military cooperation, his deputy, Anatoly Antonov, clarified 
Russia’s plans. Ostensibly, Russia did not seek actual military bases but rather a series of 
locations for resupply, maintenance, and crew rest for its ships when deployed to the 
region and for its aircraft when flying missions there.2 Given those ostensible aims, one 
may wonder just how close ties are between Russia and those states. One may wonder 
whether Russia is merely seeking strategic allies or if the Soviet “bear” is returning to the 
Western Hemisphere, especially since the incumbent leaders of two of those states—the 
Castro regime in Cuba and President Daniel Ortega of the Sandinista National Liberation 
Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua—were also Soviet allies during the Cold War.  
This thesis seeks to assess the extent of Russia’s ties with former Soviet allies in 
Latin America—namely Nicaragua and Cuba—in terms of political, security, and 
economic ties. The thesis compares Russia’s ties with the Nicaraguan and Cuban regimes 
in the contemporary era with the Soviet Union’s ties with those regimes during the Cold 
War to assess the extent to which Russia has made a comeback in the U.S. periphery. 
That assessment will have implications for U.S. policy. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question is significant because while Russia was invading Ukraine, 
it was also expanding in Latin America—though this expansion received little attention.3 
                                                 
1 Zachary Keck, “Russia Says It’s Building Naval Bases in Asia, Latin America,” Diplomat, February 
28, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/russia-says-its-building-naval-bases-in-asia-latin-america/.  
2 “Russia Has No Plans to Create Military Bases in Latin America,” Sputnik News, February 15, 2015, 
http://sptnkne.ws/advG. 
3 Stephen Blank, “Russia's Goals, Strategy and Tactics in Latin America,” LACC/ARC/U.S. Southern 
Command Policy Roundtable Series, Miami, FL, April 28, 2014, 2, 
http://lacc.fiu.edu/research/publications/security-roundtable-2014-blank-paper.pdf.  
 2 
Limited scholarly works exist concerning Russia’s reengagement with Latin American 
states, though works about China’s involvement have grown precipitously.4 R. Evan Ellis 
says, “While Russia’s activity may be on a small scale and limited to a handful of states 
and sectors, its presence will likely be a persistent facet of the new globally-
interconnected strategic environment currently reshaping the region.”5 According to 
Ellis, Russian engagement—to an extent—undermines U.S. initiatives and relationships 
with states in the region, arms anti-U.S. states, and isolates states that are close to the 
United States.6 Unlike China, Russia has openly challenged U.S. hegemony in the 
Western Hemisphere in recent years with deployments of naval vessels and flights of 
strategic bombers to the Caribbean, as well as talks on access to airfields and ports in 
Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela.7 
In his March 2015 posture statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
the Commander, U.S. Southern Command speaks of the increased Russian presence in 
Latin America. He says that in contrast to Chinese activities there, 
Russian activities in the region are more concerning. Periodically since 
2008, Russia has pursued an increased presence in Latin America through 
propaganda, military arms and equipment sales, counterdrug agreements, 
and trade. Under President Putin, however, we have seen a clear return to 
Cold War-tactics. As part of its global strategy, Russia is using power 
projection in an attempt to erode U.S. leadership and challenge U.S. 
influence in the Western Hemisphere.…Russia has courted Cuba, 
Venezuela, and Nicaragua to gain access to air bases and ports for 
resupply of Russian naval assets and strategic bombers operating in the 
Western Hemisphere. Russian media also announced Russia would begin 
sending long-range strategic bombers to patrol the Caribbean Sea and Gulf 
of Mexico, in an effort to “monitor foreign powers’ military activities and 
maritime communications.” While these actions do not pose an immediate 
                                                 
4 R. Evan Ellis, The New Russian Engagement with Latin America: Strategic Position, Commerce, and 
Dreams of the Past. Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College 
Press, June 17, 2015), 3, https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1275. 
5 Ibid., 77. 
6 Ibid., 79. 
7 R. Evan Ellis, “Russian Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Return to the ‘Strategic 




threat, Russia’s activities in the hemisphere are concerning and underscore 
the importance of remaining engaged with our partners.8 
Thus, the research question is significant because Russia’s strategic reengagement 
in the region is a facet of the security environment that is of concern but that some 
government officials and scholars may be overlooking. Moreover, the literature does not 
clearly assess the degree of closeness between Russia and its former Soviet allies 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Is the Soviet Bear Back? 
Douglas Farah and Liana Eustacia Reyes make a bold contention that Russia is 
now more influential in Latin America than it has ever been; even more than the Soviet 
Union ever was. They posit that this is the case despite U.S.-Cuban rapprochement and 
Russia’s ongoing economic downturn. They say that Russian ties with the states of the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA)—that is, Venezuela, 
Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba, and some other Caribbean island states—are firm.9 
Regarding the extent of the ties, they explain that “the Putin government is providing 
ALBA nations with weapons, police and military training and equipment, nuclear 
technology, oil exploration equipment, financial assistance and an influential friend on 
the United Nations Security Council and in other international forums.”10 The ALBA 
states reportedly reciprocate by giving Russia diplomatic support to curb its international 
isolation, especially in light of the conflict in Crimea and Ukraine. For instance, the 
ALBA states and Argentina reportedly release messages of unflagging support for 
President Putin—and of condemnation of the United States—via a regional media 
network of state-owned websites, presidential Twitter accounts, and other media. 
                                                 
8 U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command: Hearing Before the Comm. on Armed 
Services, Senate, 114th Cong., 8–9 (March 12, 2015) (statement of General John F. Kelly, U.S. Marine 
Corps, Commander, U.S. Southern Command), http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kelly_03-12-15.pdf. 
9 Douglas Farah and Liana Eustacia Reyes, “Russia in Latin America: The Strategic Challenge,” 





Moreover, ALBA states are ostensibly expanding port and airspace access for Russia’s 
deployments.11 
Regarding the timing of the renewed ties between Russia and those Latin 
American states, Pablo Telman Sánchez Ramírez says that in 2008 diplomatic visits 
intensified between them and Russia had renewed its interest in the region.12 That year 
was the Russian military’s post-Cold War return to the region, marked by the first-ever 
visit of Russian strategic bombers and a naval surface action group to Venezuela. The 
ships also visited Nicaragua and Cuba.13 Ellis concurs that Russia’s reengagement with 
Latin America thus began in 2008.14 Yet, Stephen Blank points out that Russia’s renewed 
interest in Latin America did not begin in 2008, but rather Russia began attempts to 
influence the region starting with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s visits to 
the region in 1997 and then ramped up economic efforts in 2003 and arms sales 
specifically in 2004.15 In reality, Primakov began visiting Latin American states in 1996, 
visiting Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela over the 
course of 1996 and 1997.16 During that time, Primakov reportedly commented that since 
Russia was still a great power, it should have relations with all parts of the globe.17 
2. Geopolitical Positions: Challenging U.S. Supremacy 
One argument in the literature is that Russia’s reengagement with Latin American 
states is primarily for the purpose of challenging U.S. hegemony in the region, as part of 
an effort to create a multi-polar world. Stephen Blank and Younkyoo Kim contend that 
                                                 
11 Farah and Reyes, “Russia in Latin America: The Strategic Challenge,” 1–2.  
12 Pablo Telman Sánchez Ramírez, “Is a New Climate of Confrontation between Russia and the 
United States Possible in Latin America?” Latin American Policy 1, no. 2 (2010): 232. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2041-7373.2010.00017.x/abstract. 
13 Ibid., 235; see also: Lee Willett, “The Navy in Russia’s ‘Resurgence’,” The RUSI Journal 154, no. 1 
(2009): 51, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840902818647.  
14 Ellis, New Russian Engagement, 20. 
15 Stephen Blank, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games in the US’s Neighborhood,” Russie 
Nei Visions no. 38, Russia/NIS Center, IFRI, April 2009, 5, 8, 
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09.pdf.  
16 Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and 
Sectors (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2014), 376. 
17 Blank, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games,” 8. 
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there is an interconnection between Russia’s arms sales, energy projects, and pursuit of 
military bases in the region.18 They argue that Russia’s economic ties with the region—
miniscule compared to those of the United States and China—are not Russia’s primary 
concern, since Brazil and some countries that provide foodstuffs to Russia are the only 
ones to offer it any economic ties of real value. They argue instead that geostrategic 
interests—namely opposing the United States and creating multi-polarity globally—are 
central to Russia’s engagement in the region, rather than interest in Latin American 
states’ concerns.19 According to Nikolas Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh, Primakov 
undertook his visits to the region in the late 1990s to promote multi-polarity.20  
Regarding the limited economic ties that do exist between Latin American states 
and Russia, Blank and Kim contend that Russia uses its ties in limited sectors in which it 
enjoys “comparative advantage”—arms sales, nuclear power, space launches, 
engineering—for the geopolitical purpose of leveraging “political support for Russian 
positions in world politics and against American interests.”21 Ariel Cohen and Ray 
Walser likewise offer that Russia uses arms sales “to gain friends and influence 
governments.”22 Carlos Malamud also mentions that Russia is merging its economic and 
political interests in Latin America, trying to take upon itself the role that the Soviet 
Union had previously played in the region. In doing so, Russia aligns itself mainly with 
                                                 
18 Stephen Blank and Younkyoo Kim, “Russia and Latin America: The New Frontier for Geopolitics, 
Arms Sales and Energy,” Problems of Post-Communism 62, no. 3 (2015): 160–61, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2015.1019817.  
19 Ibid., 160, 169; see also: W. Alejandro Sánchez, “Russia and Latin America at the Dawn of the 
Twenty-First Century,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 8, no. 4 (2010): 368, 377, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2010.522355; Luis Fleischman, Latin America in the Post-Chávez Era: 
The Security Threat to the United States (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2013), 149. 
20 Gvosdev and Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy, 376. 
21 Blank and Kim, “Russia and Latin America,” 161.  
22 Ariel Cohen and Ray Walser, “The Russia-Venezuela Axis: Using Energy for Geopolitical 




states that, like itself, have a confrontational relationship with the United States, namely 
the Bolivarian, or ALBA, states, as mentioned.23 
Moreover, Russia has involved itself with various multilateral regional 
associations—reportedly to increase its great power status relative to that of the United 
States.24 Ellis indicates that Russia’s engagements with not only ALBA but also such 
regional forums as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) 
“strengthen its ties with the region in a way that excludes the United States.”25 In 
November 2008, then President Medvedev attended the ALBA leadership summit in 
Caracas. Subsequently, in May 2013, the Russian foreign minister attended a meeting 
with the CELAC foreign ministers, and Putin reportedly conveyed desire to develop a 
relationship with CELAC.26 Ellis says that “Russia has similarly indicated interest in 
‘substantive interactions’ with UNASUR, the Pacific Alliance [and other regional 
alliances], notably ignoring a demonstration of interest in the Organization of American 
States (OAS), in which the United States and Canada are members.”27 
Meanwhile, Russia’s counter-narcotics efforts in the region may also be an effort 
to increase its influence. In 2012, the director of the Russian Federal Drug Control 
Service (FSKN), Viktor Ivanov, toured Latin America—visiting foreign ministers, police 
officials, and other officials in Nicaragua, Cuba, Mexico, El Salvador, Panama, and 
Brazil to solicit cooperation with Russia to counter illicit drug trafficking—even though 
the quantity of Latin American-produced drugs making their way to Russia has been 
relatively low.28 Ostensibly, only three tons of the estimated 940 tons of cocaine 
                                                 
23 Carlos Malamud, “Regional Integration and Cooperation in Latin America: Diagnosis and 
Proposals,” Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies 7, no. 2 (2015): 108, 
http://eme.sagepub.com/content/7/2/92.full.pdf.  
24 Stephen J. Blank, “Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” Challenges to Security 
in the Hemisphere Task Force, University of Miami Center for Hemispheric Policy, April 13, 2010, 5, 
https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf. 
25 Ellis, New Russian Engagement, 12. 
26 Ibid., 2, 13. 
27 Ibid., 13. 
28 Alexander Marshall, From Drug War to Culture War: Russia’s Growing Role in the Global Drug 
Debate, Policy Brief 5, Global Drug Policy Observatory, Swansea University, July 2014, 16, 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/gdpo/files/GDPO%20Russia%20Article-1.pdf. 
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produced in the Andes region every year go to Russia.29 Nonetheless, Ivanov’s outreach 
to the region is part of Russia’s global “Rainbow-3” initiative to cooperatively counter 
trafficking at the centers of production in Afghanistan and Latin America by focusing on 
development problems, namely unemployment and poverty.30 Thus, Ivanov’s Rainbow-3 
differs from U.S. initiatives like Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative that ostensibly 
“rely on military, police or administrative and legal actions and entirely exclude the 
elimination of the social causes of drug production.”31 Russian efforts in the region that 
have actually materialized include intelligence sharing and joint operations with 
Nicaragua and Peru, as well as a new Russian counter-narcotics center in Managua.32  
Farah claims that the purpose of that training center is to supplant U.S. counter-
drug initiatives in the region.33 Yet, U.S. officials reportedly do not see Russia’s counter-
narcotics activities in the region as counter to U.S. efforts. U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement William Brownfield has 
welcomed Russia’s contributions in the collaborative effort against globalized narcotics 
trafficking, reportedly saying, “‘The truth is that we want collaboration, and if the 
collaboration comes from Russia in our hemisphere or if it’s the United States in Russia’s 
hemisphere, then I think that is positive.’”34 Nevertheless, Pamela Izaguirre and Darya 
Vakulenko indicate that “Russian assistance to Nicaragua…is evidence of its rebirth as a 
diplomatic force in Latin America.”35 
                                                 
29 Lyubov Lyulko, “Russia Offers Latin America to Combat Drugs Together,” Pravda, March 12, 
2012, http://www.pravdareport.com/russia/economics/12-03-2012/120748-russia_latin_america_drugs-0/. 
30 Marshall, From Drug War to Culture War, 16. 
31 Lyulko, “Russia Offers Latin America to Combat Drugs Together.” 
32 Ellis, “Russian Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 5. 
33 Russian Engagement in the Western Hemisphere: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere, House of Representatives, 114th Cong., 9 (October 22, 2015) (statement of Douglas Farah, 
President, IBI Consultants, LLC), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20151022/104073/HHRG-114-
FA07-Transcript-20151022.pdf. 
34 Tim Rogers, “U.S. Welcomes Russian Support for Nicaragua’s Drug War,” Nicaragua Dispatch, 
March 31, 2013, http://nicaraguadispatch.com/2013/03/us-welcomes-russian-support-for-nicaraguas-drug-
war/. 
35 Pamela F. Izaguirre and Darya Vakulenko, “Russia and Nicaragua: Working Together To Foil 
International Drug Trafficking,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, April 10, 2013, 
http://www.coha.org/22213/.  
 8 
Farah also argues that the leaders of the Bolivarian states have allowed Russia and 
other extra-regional actors—namely China and Iran—as well as leaders of the Bolivarian 
states themselves, to supplant U.S. influence in Latin America. He contends that the U.S. 
government has decreased its engagement with Latin America dramatically since 2010, 
marked by significant decreases in civilian aid and security assistance to the region—thus 
creating a vacuum of influence.36 Farah holds that the Bolivarian governments have 
endeavored to replace U.S. security doctrine with a “lethal doctrine of asymmetrical 
warfare, inspired by authoritarian governments.”37 He mentions that the Bolivarian 
governments also regularly provide political support to states that act counter to U.S. 
interests including Russia with regard to its involvement in Ukraine and annexation of 
Crimea.38 The Bolivarian leaders believe that Russia, China, and Iran are “natural allies 
of the Bolivarian Revolution.”39  
3. Yet, Russia Not Getting Too Close 
Despite those geopolitical in-roads that Russia has made with the Bolivarian 
states, it reportedly does not desire to establish a relationship like it had with Cuba during 
the Cold War. It reportedly is not likely to go to war over a Latin American ally as the 
Soviet Union almost did in Cuba.40 According to the literature, Russia exercises restraint 
so as to not provoke the United States too much. Ellis indicates, “Russian activities in the 
region openly aid anti-U.S. regimes and challenge U.S. positions and interests in the 
region. They do not, however, directly seek harm to the U.S., nor are sufficient in size or 
                                                 
36 Douglas Farah, “The Advance of Radical Populist Doctrine in Latin America: How the Bolivarian 
Alliance is Remaking Militaries, Dismantling Democracy and Combatting the Empire,” Prism 5, no. 3 
(2015): 91–92, http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-
3/The_Advance_Of_Radical_Populist_Doctrine_in_Latin_America.pdf. 
37 Ibid., 92. 
38 Ibid., 93. 
39 Ibid., 103. 
40 Sánchez, “Russia and Latin America at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century,” 377; David R. 
Mares, Latin America and the Illusion of Peace, Adelphi Series 52, no. 429 (London: IISS, 2012), 77, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/tadl20/52/429#.VeU2WHbn83G.  
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scope to seriously undermine the U.S. position there.”41 Indeed, Sánchez Ramírez 
mentions Russia’s cautious stance in its relations with late Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chávez; the Russian government avoided involving itself in Chávez’s effort to personally 
lead the anti-U.S. bloc in the region.42 Moreover, when Russia deployed the 
aforementioned flotilla to the Caribbean in 2008, it cut short the exercise that the flotilla 
conducted with the Venezuelan navy to preclude provoking the United States too much. 
Another example of Russian restraint is that during its Tu-160 bomber mission in the 
Caribbean that same year, Russia let the United States know that its bombers were not 
armed with nuclear weapons.43 Overall, Russia’s demonstrated restraint supports W. 
Alejandro Sánchez’s contention in 2010 that “Moscow does not regard Latin America as 
vital or critical to its foreign policy.”44 Instead, ties between Russia and Latin American 
states may be ephemeral and dependent on the U.S. stance in Russia’s backyard, as 
Sánchez Ramírez has contended.45 
Indeed, an argument in the literature is that Russia is mainly just trying to send a 
message to the United States that it is displeased with U.S. and NATO interference in 
Russia’s periphery. Ellis posits that Russia’s efforts to obtain access to support bases for 
its warships and bombers to operate in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, its patrols in 
the Caribbean since 2008, and its alleged interest in reopening the Lourdes signals 
intelligence facility in Cuba are “strategic moves designed to enhance Russian freedom of 
action in its own region by forcing a U.S. response. Such moves are, in part, the 
continuation of a strategic global ‘game’ that the Soviet Union played with the United 
States during the Cold War.”46 During the 2008 Georgian conflict, amid diplomatic 
visits, Russia seemingly sent the aforementioned Tu-160 bombers and four-ship flotilla to 
                                                 
41 R. Evan Ellis, “Russia, Iran, and China in Latin America: Evaluating the Threat,” American Foreign 
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operate in the Caribbean as warnings that Russia could still project power in close 
proximity to the United States, as the latter was doing near Russia. The United States had 
deployed naval vessels to the Black Sea near Russia.47 According to Sánchez Ramírez, 
the deployments were also in response to the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system 
in Europe and NATO’s placement of bases closer to Russia.48 Likewise, a flight of two 
Tu-160s to Venezuela and Nicaragua in 2013 appears to have been a reaction to further 
development of the BMD system and meant to intimidate the United States.49 In 2014, 
Russian leaders ramped up diplomatic visits to the region and began declaring the 
aforementioned basing plans—ostensibly as a strategic warning in response to U.S. 
involvement in the Ukraine crisis.50 Russia’s messaging may also support its allies; in 
2013, the Tu-160s breached Colombian airspace over waters claimed by Nicaragua.51 
Sánchez refers to this dynamic as the “tit-for-tat syndrome.”52 He says, “Unlike in 
the Cold War, there is no major ideology guiding Russian foreign policy besides national 
greatness and gaining beachheads in a region where the United States has a historical 
sphere of influence, much as Washington has done in post-Soviet areas.”53 Yet, 
according to Sánchez, the gaining of beachheads in Bolivarian states does not mean the 
Russian military is returning to Latin America; rather, it signifies that Russia would have 
ports and airfields to utilize for its trips to and exercises in the Caribbean, which would 
be an act of “‘soft’ defiance” by states in the region against U.S. military supremacy in 
the hemisphere.54 
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4. Commercial Ties, Arms Sales, Energy as Important 
Contrary to the aforementioned position that Russia does not care much about 
economic ties with Latin America, there is the position that both Russia and Latin 
American states are concerned about economic ties in and of themselves. Sánchez 
recounts that some commentaries discuss the importance of Latin American sources of 
foodstuffs and other commodities to Russia, which, in turn, supplies them with 
technology-intensive products like vehicles and machinery.55 José de Arimateia da Cruz 
indicates that Latin America’s bountiful natural resources make cooperation with the 
region a Russian foreign policy priority—perhaps contrary to the aforementioned position 
that Latin America is not pivotal to Russian foreign policy.56 Dmitri Trenin in 2007 
contended that economic interests are more important to Russia than are geopolitical 
considerations, saying that “fluctuating energy prices, not nuclear warheads, are what 
really matter to Moscow.”57 Yet, he did write that article before the Georgia crisis and 
Russia’s military return to Latin America in 2008. 
According to the literature, material gains are a driver for Latin American states’ 
ties with Russia too. Blank says, “Nicaragua recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia to 
obtain Russian military and economic assistance to replace its aging arsenal of Soviet 
weapons….Cuba’s continuing interest in strengthened ties with Russia stems from its 
endless need for assistance and is driven, at least partly, by its prior path of dependence 
upon Moscow and its economic largesse.”58 Moreover, Venezuela came to rely on Russia 
for arms after the United States would no longer sell it parts for its F-16 aircraft.59 
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5. Limited Resources and Other Limitations 
Regardless of whether Russia’s reengagement with Latin American states is more 
geopolitically or economically motivated, Russian economic woes seem to be a hindrance 
to deeper relations between Russia and Latin American states. Blank, speaking in 2010 of 
the impacts of the Global Financial Crisis, said, “while Russia will continue expanding its 
ties to Latin America, Russia’s capacities for deep involvement are less than it wants, as 
is Latin American states’ ability to support Russian goals….Thus, Russia will only 
partially, if at all, meet Latin American expectations for support, even in stricken 
economies like Cuba.”60 Likewise, Ellis contends, contrary to Farah and Reyes, that 
ongoing low oil prices, as well as economic sanctions against Russia since 2014, are 
likely to inhibit Russia’s investment in Latin America for arms purchases and energy and 
mining projects.61 According to Ellis, resource constraints have limited Russia’s 
engagement to three groups: former Soviet allies Cuba and Nicaragua, other states such 
as Venezuela that will risk developing ties with Russia counter to U.S. influence, and 
other states with which Russia has a vested interest in furthering economic ties—namely 
Brazil, Peru, and Argentina.62  
Yet, Russia has faced limitations even with those states. It has had to counter 
resentment by the Cuban regime for the perceived Soviet abandonment of Cuba.63 
Meanwhile, reemerging ties with Nicaragua have only taken place due to the return to 
power of President Ortega in 2007.64 Sánchez argues that Russia establishing bases in 
either of those two countries or Venezuela is unlikely.65 He notes that a Russian base 
would be seriously detrimental to Havana’s efforts to improve its ties with Washington 
and that “the Nicaraguan government has stated that, while it seeks closer military 
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cooperation with Moscow, a Russian military base in that Central American country is 
out of the question.”66 The establishment of a foreign military base would breach both the 
Nicaraguan and the Venezuelan constitutions.67  
Meanwhile, opposition political victories in Venezuela and Argentina in late 2015 
portend diminished relations between those countries and Russia. As a result of the 
December 2015 National Assembly elections in Venezuela, the “opposition parties now 
hold a supermajority and can frustrate much of the government’s agenda.”68 Opposition 
leaders question the necessity of Venezuela spending exorbitantly on defense, as the 
country is in an economic crisis. Thus, any potential talks over further arms deals with 
Russia could be non-starters.69 Ellis indicates that the opposition victory has rendered 
Venezuela an unreliable partner for Russia. Moreover, Ellis offers that Mauricio Macri’s 
victory in Argentina’s November 2015 presidential race portends an Argentine move 
“back toward a more balanced international engagement posture, rebuilding relationships 
with Brazil and the United States that were badly damaged during the Kirchner era, and 
moving the nation away from its embrace of Russia and China.”70 
6. Summary of Mixed Messages in Literature 
Based on themes in the literature, one sees a few mixed messages. A definite 
mixed message is whether geopolitical or material considerations are Russia’s primary 
concern vis-à-vis the region. Another inconsistency entails whether or not Latin America 
is pivotal to Russian foreign policy and thus whether Russian ties with the region will be 
ephemeral or enduring. Finally, different opinions exist on whether lower oil prices will 
limit Russia’s involvement in Latin America.  
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Hypothesis 1: Contemporary Russia’s engagement with former Soviet allies does 
not represent a return of the Soviet “bear” to the U.S. periphery. Russia’s military and 
economic support to FSLN-led Nicaragua and the Castro regime in Cuba are much less 
significant than the ties the Soviet Union had with those regimes. The closeness of ties 
between Russia and former Soviet allies in the region predominately entails mutual 
political support and a limited Russian military/security presence. This hypothesis 
contrasts with Farah and Reyes’s contention that contemporary Russia is more influential 
in the region than was the Soviet Union.71 This hypothesis supports the positions that 
Russia is engaging Latin America mostly for the geopolitical interests of challenging U.S. 
supremacy and demonstrating displeasure with U.S. activities in Russia’s periphery.72 
Thus, this hypothesis may support Sánchez Ramírez’s statement that “ties between Latin 
America and Russia will be only temporary and will depend on the position that the 
United States takes toward Russia.”73 
Hypothesis 2: Although material ties between Russia and former Soviet allies in 
Latin America are relatively insignificant and strategic ties like Russian deployments and 
basing talks seem fleeting, their ties may actually be more enduring—versus ephemeral—
in limited areas such as counter-narcotics cooperation and relief of Soviet-era debts. As 
Russia may be undertaking these ties to boost its influence, this hypothesis does not 
contradict the position that these ties are meant to challenge U.S. supremacy. 
Hypothesis 3: Russia’s ties with Nicaragua today are greater than its ties with 
Cuba due to Cuban resentment of Soviet abandonment. According to Blank, Russia may 
be turning toward closer ties with Nicaragua as its strategic partner of choice in the 
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region.74 Resentment over Soviet abandonment seems to have been a roadblock in the 
way of Russia’s reengagement with former allies, especially Cuba.75 
Hypothesis 4: Russia’s economic ties with Nicaragua and Cuba have declined 
since 2014 due to such factors as the downturn of the oil market and the economic 
sanctions against Russia. This hypothesis aligns with Ellis’s contention that low oil prices 
and the sanctions against Russia are likely to inhibit Russia’s investment in Latin 
America for arms purchases and energy and mining projects.76  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis compares the political, security, and economic ties that FSLN-led 
Nicaragua and Castro-led Cuba had with the Soviet Union during the Cold War to the ties 
those same Latin American regimes have had with Russia in the contemporary era. This 
study analyzes the extent to which Russia’s reengagement with former Soviet allies 
portends a return of Soviet era-like relations, as well as whether ties with contemporary 
Russia are consistent between the two cases. Not explored in this thesis are case studies 
of Russia’s relations with Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and other countries with which 
Russia has had significant ties in the contemporary era. Venezuela and Argentina’s 
aforementioned political uncertainty renders them tenuous case studies to examine at this 
time. Chapters II and III of this thesis are case studies for Soviet and Russian ties with 
Nicaragua and Cuba, respectively. Chapter IV addresses the analysis of the hypotheses 
and implications for U.S. policy. 
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II. NICARAGUAN-RUSSIAN TIES 
As noted in the previous chapter, this thesis seeks to assess the ties between 
contemporary Russia and former Soviet allies in Latin America and to discuss the 
implications of those ties for U.S. policy. The case of Nicaragua supports the argument 
that Russian engagement with former Soviet allies today does not mean that the United 
States’ Cold War-era adversary has made a comeback in the region. This chapter first 
examines Nicaragua’s ties with the Soviet Union during Ortega’s first period of rule from 
1979 to 1990 and then assesses Nicaragua’s ties with Russia during Ortega’s ongoing 
rule since 2007; for each period, the thesis assesses the closeness of bilateral political, 
security, and economic ties. 
A. SOVIET-NICARAGUAN TIES IN THE COLD WAR 
Latin America was not a priority for the Soviets for most of the twentieth century. 
After the Soviet Union’s establishment, it developed ties to some extent with leftists and 
revolutionaries in the region, but it was not until the success of the Cuban Revolution in 
1959 that the Soviets took an interest in the region as a place for advancing communism 
and gaining a strategic foothold vis-à-vis the United States.77 Ellis says that Fidel 
Castro’s success “showed the Soviet Union the potential for leftist movements and others 
supportive of the USSR to come to power by force in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Driven in part by such new optimism…the USSR began to develop important centers of 
Latin American studies.”78 Nonetheless, “the Soviets also discouraged the small orthodox 
Communist parties from engaging in violence and were reluctant to support leftist groups 
advocating revolution.”79 For instance, the Soviets were largely unwilling to provide 
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material support to Jamaica’s Michael Manley in the 1970s.80 Instead, the Cubans took 
the lead with overt military support to such leftists—as the Cubans had done in Africa.81 
The Soviet Union did not start serious engagement with Nicaragua until after the 
FSLN rebels’ victory in 1979. Nicaragua and the Soviet Union had established 
diplomatic relations with each other during World War II, when the Soviets were allies of 
the United States. Nonetheless, for most of the Cold War, the Soviets were not interested 
in engaging Central American countries because their leaders were anti-communist.82 
Local Communists in Central America and beyond had come into disrepute, first due to 
the Stalin-Hitler agreement of 1939 and later due to Soviet guidance that Communists 
seek compromise with their countries’ dictators.83 Moreover, as Marc Edelman states, 
“For the most part, Soviet analysts writing before 1979 believed Nicaragua to be one of 
the places in Latin America (if not the place) where U.S. domination was strongest.”84  
Indeed, up until the FSLN-led revolution in the late 1970s, the United States 
maintained a very strong foothold in Nicaragua. The U.S. military occupied Nicaragua 
for the majority of two decades starting in 1912. U.S. troops withdrew by 1932 after a 
stalemate with the forces of rebel leader Augusto C. Sandino. While occupying 
Nicaragua, the United States had compelled Nicaragua to establish its National Guard. 
Under the command of Anastasio Somoza García, the National Guard killed Sandino and 
took control of Nicaragua. Somoza and his two sons—in succession—led Nicaragua as 
dictators from 1936 until 1979. The Somozas were staunchly pro-U.S. and were thus 
“anti-Axis” and subsequently “anti-Communist.”85  
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1. The Revolution and the Superpowers 
As the revolution unfolded in the late 1970s, the Sandinistas were not yet in 
league with the Soviet Union; the Soviets had little interest in the revolution.86 
Contemporary analysts such as those at Stratfor would have one believe that the Soviets 
supported the revolution and enabled the FSLN to come to power.87 To the contrary, 
according to Danuta Paszyn, “There is convincing evidence that the Soviet Union played 
no active role in nor gave any direct material assistance to the guerrilla war in Nicaragua. 
However, it has been alleged that the Sandinistas received some support in the form of 
training, weapons and limited financial aid from their friend and ally, Cuba.”88 The 
Soviets saw the revolution as unlikely to succeed, and even the local Soviet-affiliated 
Partido Socialista Nicaragüense (PSN) did not join the Sandinistas until shortly before 
they emerged victorious in 1979.89 The PSN’s position—as reportedly related in PSN 
member Carlos Fonseca’s 1958 book Un Nicaragüense en Moscú [A Nicaraguan in 
Moscow]—had been “that Nicaragua needed not a revolutionary transformation but a 
long process of reform.”90 It was not until the Sandinista victory seemed promising that 
the Soviets began to take an interest in the Nicaraguan revolution.91 
After taking power in 1979, the FSLN initially desired to maintain relations with 
the United States, but with reduced U.S. influence in Nicaragua’s affairs.92 Indeed, “in 
1979 and 1980 the Sandinistas had fairly good working relations with the United States 
but warily regarded U.S. links to several thousand National Guardsmen who had escaped 
to Honduras and the United States.”93 During the late 1970s, ties between the United 
States and the Somoza regime had become strained to some extent, as the Carter 
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administration and Congress withheld military aid due to allegations of human rights 
abuses perpetrated by the Nicaraguan National Guard.94 After the FSLN took power, the 
Carter administration offered the nascent regime diplomatic recognition and aid including 
a $75 million loan.95 Western Europe provided even more aid.96 
Nevertheless, when President Reagan came to power in 1981, the tables turned. 
His administration immediately labeled the Sandinistas as Marxist-Leninists and 
considered them to be in league with the Soviet Union in its plot to subvert democratic 
governments.97 Paszyn says, “The Nicaraguan revolution and the growing revolutionary 
tide in neighbouring states of Central America, notably El Salvador and Guatemala, were 
viewed by Reagan and his advisers in an East-West context instead of indigenous and 
North-South contexts.”98 By August 1981, the U.S. military and the CIA began funding 
the counter-revolutionary Contras for their operations against the FSLN regime; then, the 
CIA itself began directing operations against the regime as well. These operations, as 
well as economic and political coercion from the Reagan administration, took a toll on 
Nicaragua’s economy and cost thousands of lives.99 
2. The Soviet Bloc Helps the New Regime 
With the United States working to counter the FSLN regime, the Soviet Union 
subsequently escalated its support for the regime—doing so to counter U.S. efforts, rather 
than to prop up a socialist regime. Paszyn argues “that the Soviet Union did not intend to 
establish socialism in Nicaragua or a second ‘Cuba,’ nor to promote a social 
revolutionary change in El Salvador and Guatemala, but merely to cause problems for the 
United States.”100 Likewise, Jaime Suchlicki wrote, “While communization of Latin 
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America may be a long-term, and probably far-off, aspiration, the immediate objective of 
the Soviet Union is to facilitate any developments which promise to weaken U.S. ties 
with, or even to isolate the U.S. from, its present Latin American supporters.”101 Indeed, 
by the latter period of Leonid Brezhnev’s administration in the early 1980s, the Soviet 
Union had prioritized pragmatism over shared socialist ideology in its relations with 
Third World regimes, in light of its faltering economy. As such, the Soviets provided 
only the near-term support that Nicaragua needed to ensure its economic viability and 
sovereignty in the face of U.S. antagonism.102 Paszyn says, “Moscow repeatedly made it 
clear that it would not underwrite the economic and financial costs of the revolution as it 
had done in Cuba, but as U.S. hostility increased so did the Soviet Union’s 
commitment.”103 
Indeed, the Soviet Union did progressively increase its support to the FSLN 
regime as the following three sub-sections detail about Soviet political, military, and 
economic support to the FSLN regime; but the Soviet government “moved in ways 
designed to avoid directly provoking the United States.”104 While the Cubans provided 
material support to the regime ahead of the Soviets, the Soviets eventually provided most 
of the material support and direction.105 The Soviet Union relied on intermediaries—
mostly the Cubans—to deliver most of its support, so as to not provoke a reaction from 
the United States against the Soviet Union and to avoid damaging Soviet relations with 
other states in the region.106  
a. Political Ties 
Analysts like those at Stratfor seemingly take a Reagan-esque view on the 
ideological ties between the Soviet Union and the FSLN regime. Fred Burton and Scott 
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Stewart at Stratfor mention, “There has always been a tight relationship between the 
Marxist FSLN and its ideological brethren and patrons in places like Cuba and the Soviet 
Union.”107 To the contrary, the FSLN was not simply a Marxist organization. Its 
ideology was a blend of Marxism, nationalism, liberation theology, and liberalism.108 
Martha Cottam adds, “Sandinismo, not a clearly defined ideology, was imbued with 
nationalism and attention to national ills. It called for social and economic justice, 
democracy, agrarian reform, and a mixed public-private economy.”109 Thus, the FLSN’s 
goal was to implement its own unique form of socialism.110 
Regardless, the Soviet Union did establish political ties with the FSLN regime. In 
1980, the Soviets recognized “the FSLN as the vanguard and leading force in the 
Nicaraguan revolution, a role traditionally ascribed to Communist parties.”111 Indeed, the 
PSN had only a minor role in the new government.112 In 1980, the Soviets opened a 
diplomatic mission in Managua. By 1982, the Nicaraguan foreign and defense ministers, 
the FSLN political commission chairman, and even the FSLN military junta head—and 
later president—Daniel Ortega all visited Moscow.113 
Nevertheless, neither the Soviet Union nor the FSLN regime was fully politically 
committed to the other. Despite Soviet recognition of the regime, “the heterodox nature 
of Sandinismo and the revolution itself made it difficult for the Soviets to make any 
major commitment to Nicaragua. Moreover, the Soviets did not seem to see that objective 
conditions necessary for the transition to socialism were existent there.”114  Thus, the 
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Soviets refrained from labeling Nicaragua as “socialist” to avoid fully committing itself 
to the nascent revolutionary regime. As mentioned, the Soviets did not want to shoulder 
another Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. They actually encouraged Nicaragua to 
diversify its international relations instead of relying solely on the Soviet bloc.115 Indeed, 
Nicaragua did diversify its diplomatic and economic ties, even with a number of non-
Communist countries including Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, and Spain. 
Moreover, in the early 1980s, Nicaragua did not always side with the Soviet Union on 
significant votes in the United Nations (UN), though it did often vote the same as the 
Soviet Union and contrary to the United States.116 
b. Security Ties 
After the revolution, the FSLN regime turned to the Soviet bloc for arms, in light 
of the effective U.S. drive to keep its allies from selling Nicaragua weapons. The Soviets 
did begin providing weapons to the regime, but they did so in such a way as to not 
provoke backlash from the United States. As such, the Soviet weapons provided were 
purportedly more defensive in nature. Notably, the Soviets turned down FSLN requests 
for MiG fighter aircraft, with which the regime could potentially threaten other states in 
the region. Moreover, as mentioned, the Soviets used intermediaries—namely the 
Cubans, East Germans, and North Koreans—to sell or deliver arms to Nicaragua.117 
Besides those Communist partners, the Soviets called upon Libya and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) to assist the Nicaraguans.118 Starting in the early 1980s, a 
number of Soviet towed artillery guns, multiple-rocket launchers (MRLs), armored 
personnel carriers, amphibious vehicles, Mi-8 “Hip” transport helicopters, and anti-
aircraft artillery guns made their way to the Nicaraguan regime. Meanwhile, Bulgaria 
delivered amphibious vehicles, North Korea delivered MRLs, and Libya exported about 
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100 SA-7 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and reportedly even a pair of 
SA-8 vehicle-mounted surface-to-air missile systems.119 
Military aid from the Soviets and the other Communist and radical governments 
truly intensified in 1984.120 The regime still did not receive MiG fighters, but “by the end 
of 1984 Nicaragua had the heavy military equipment that it needed not only to eliminate 
the Contra threat in the near future but also to increase military costs to the United States, 
if invaded.”121 That year, the Soviets provided Nicaragua its first set of eight Mi-24 
“Hind” attack helicopters, several older-model tanks, and approximately 1,500 SA-7 
MANPADS.122 Moreover, as a first, the Soviets shipped the Mi-24s in their inaugural 
direct shipment of weapons to Nicaragua, as opposed to sending them through an 
intermediary such as Cuba. The CIA assessed that the Soviets did so to more directly 
strengthen the FSLN government after Nicaraguan leaders visited Russia in 1984.123 
In 1986 and 1987, Soviet arms deliveries again intensified. Paszyn indicates that 
the Soviets did so in response to ramped-up U.S. rhetoric and military actions in Central 
America.124 The Nicaraguan regime received further shipments of Mi-24 attack 
helicopters, a small fleet of fixed-wing transport aircraft, and hundreds of SA-14 and SA-
16 MANPADS—more advanced than their existing SA-7s. Moreover, they continued to 
receive tanks, amphibious vehicles, and transport helicopters, but still no MiG fighter 
aircraft.125 Thus, ostensibly, “Nicaragua’s military posture remained defensive and 
unsuited to any offensive actions against its neighbours, despite its military build-up and 
weapons purchases from the Soviet bloc.”126 
                                                 
119 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, accessed 
December 5, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/armstransfers. 
120 Director of Central Intelligence, Nicaragua: Soviet Bloc and Radical Support for the Sandinista 
Regime, Special National Intelligence Estimate 83.3-3-85, CIA Historical Review Program (Washington, 
DC: CIA, March 1985), 3, http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/0000681978. 
121 Paszyn, Soviet Attitude to Political and Social Change, 51. 
122 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. 
123 Director of Central Intelligence, Nicaragua: Soviet Bloc and Radical Support, 5, 7. 
124 Paszyn, Soviet Attitude to Political and Social Change, 79. 
125 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. 
126 Paszyn, Soviet Attitude to Political and Social Change, 79. 
 25 
In addition to the Soviet Union’s usual attempts at obscuring its involvement in 
arms shipments to Nicaragua, Soviet personnel involvement was also discreet. For 
comparison, by 1982, Cuban military and security personnel in Nicaragua numbered over 
2,000, whereas only about 50 to 75 Soviet military personnel were there. Nonetheless, of 
those few Soviet personnel, several acted as advisers to the Nicaraguan General Staff and 
thus were involved in key planning.127 Others assembled the delivered helicopters, while 
some did venture out to the combat areas as observers or evaluators. In contrast, Cuban 
personnel were more directly involved with operations; they flew helicopters in combat, 
kept up Nicaragua’s RADAR sites, and assisted the Nicaraguans with signals intelligence 
collection and processing. By 1985, the number of Cuban military and security personnel 
had increased to between 2,500 and 3,500, while the number of personnel from the Soviet 
Union remained about the same as in 1982. Small numbers of security personnel from 
other European Communist countries, North Korea, Libya, and the PLO were also 
present—either as trainers or for intelligence support. Cuba also provided the vast 
majority of civilian technicians—about 3,500 to 4,000 in 1985—compared with 150 from 
the Soviet Union and 200 from Eastern Europe. Cuba also hosted several hundred 
Nicaraguan military trainees by 1985, while the Soviet Union and other European 
Communist countries and North Korea hosted a few hundred as well. In a few of the 
countries including the Soviet Union, many Nicaraguan pilots trained to fly MiG fighters, 
which, as mentioned, the Soviets never gave them.128 
Regarding facilities, the Soviets seemingly did not establish a base in Nicaragua. 
They set up a medical facility at Chinandega in 1982, with a Soviet staff. Also, they may 
have assisted the FSLN regime and the Cubans with setting up four high-
frequency/direction-finding (HF/DF) signals intelligence sites in Nicaragua in the early 
1980s with Soviet HF/DF equipment.129 Altogether, the Soviet military and security 
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presence in Nicaragua during the 1980s was seemingly restrained and plausibly done to 
keep the new regime afloat in response to U.S. antagonism.130 
c. Economic Ties 
Like military assistance, significant economic assistance to the nascent FSLN 
regime was slow in coming from the Soviet Union. From 1979 to 1982, the Soviets only 
provided $76 million worth of economic aid to the regime, whereas the United States 
provided it twice as much. As mentioned, the Soviet Union was hesitant to take on the 
burden of another dependency like Cuba, due to the Soviet economic downturn. As 
Nicaragua and the Soviet Union lacked complementarity between their economies, the 
Soviets encouraged the FSLN to maintain economic ties with the United States.131 
Nevertheless, the Reagan administration’s economic pressure on Nicaragua drove 
deeper Soviet economic assistance to it. Indeed, the Nicaraguans had limited options for 
assistance.132 Booth, et alia summarize it best, “U.S. pressures to curtail Western credit to 
and trade with Nicaragua forced increasing reliance on the Eastern bloc for credit, other 
aid, and trade in the mid-1980s.”133 In Reagan’s first year, the United States reneged on a 
grain credit to Nicaragua; the Soviets responded with a donation of 20,000 tons of wheat. 
By 1983, the Soviet Union had become Nicaragua’s top wheat provider.134 Thereafter, 
Soviet economic assistance—like military assistance—increased significantly, as 
“Soviet-Nicaraguan ties developed proportionately, in response to the increasing U.S. 
hostility.”135 By the mid-1980s, aid from multilateral lenders like the World Bank had 
dried up. Meanwhile, the value of Soviet-Nicaraguan trade skyrocketed from 100,000 
rubles in 1980 to 42 million rubles in 1983 and then grew five-fold from 1983 to 1985.136 
Total economic aid from Communist countries including the Soviet Union increased 
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from about $160 million in 1983 to $220 million in 1984.137 In 1985, Gorbachev further 
increased economic support to Nicaragua, after the United States emplaced a trade 
embargo against it.138 Thereafter, Soviet oil deliveries, which had increased six-fold from 
1983 to 1984, began to fulfill 80 percent of Nicaragua’s oil requirements.139 
Nonetheless, as with political ties and military assistance, the Soviets still 
preferred a more discreet and non-committed economic relationship. While Gorbachev 
increased assistance to Nicaragua in 1985, he was careful, according to Paszyn, to avoid 
“furthering any special relationship that could mean new heavy investments, which the 
Soviets wished to avoid for both economic and political reasons. Any dramatic increase 
in the Soviet presence in Nicaragua would have given fresh credibility to the arguments 
put forward by the hostile Reagan administration.”140 Tellingly, in 1985, the Soviet 
Union and Eastern European Communist countries denied Nicaragua’s requests for full 
membership in their Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).141 By 
1987, the Soviet Union began to really show its inability to commit economically to 
Nicaragua; that year, it significantly decreased its oil provision—meeting only about half 
of Nicaragua’s demand.142 
3. The Soviet Union Curbs Its Support to the FSLN 
In the late 1980s, Soviet support to the FSLN regime declined. Paszyn notes, 
“With the introduction of Gorbachev’s policy of ‘new thinking’ in 1985, Moscow’s 
advocacy for a peaceful settlement to the Central American crisis became more 
pronounced.”143 Shortly before the U.S. presidential election in 1988, the Soviets decided 
“to suspend temporarily the delivery of heavy weapons to Nicaragua and, also, to limit 
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the deliveries of light weapons.”144 Ostensibly, they did so because the United States had 
suspended military aid to the Contras earlier in the year and also wanted to influence the 
new administration’s policy approach toward Nicaragua. Furthermore, the Soviets 
insisted that the Cubans and the FSLN regime stop supplying arms to any group in Latin 
America, though both continued providing arms to guerrillas in El Salvador in 1989.145  
The Soviet foreign ministry desired to reach settlements to the conflicts in the 
region, in favor of Soviet interests as opposed to those of foreign ideologues like Castro. 
By 1989, Gorbachev began cooperating with President George H.W. Bush to resolve the 
conflicts, moved to develop diplomatic relations with all Central American governments 
including that of El Salvador, and stopped consulting Castro on such matters.146 
Meanwhile, in Nicaragua and other Third World countries such as Vietnam, Gorbachev 
encouraged “‘national reconciliation’ under which pro-Soviet, ‘vanguard-party’-ruled 
countries involved in armed conflicts with Western-assisted anti-communist 
movements…form governments of national unity with their enemies.”147 Since 
Communist rule had already ended in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany by late 
1989, the Soviets showed that they would tolerate the demise of such Third World 
regimes as the FSLN regime if such demise occurred due to loss in democratic elections. 
Indeed, after Ortega lost to opposition candidate Violeta Barrios de Chamorro in the 
Soviet- and Western-demanded free election of February 1990, the Soviets level-
headedly recognized her victory and extended economic assistance to her 
administration.148 
B. CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN-NICARAGUAN TIES 
Post-Cold War Russia seemingly began to seek political influence in Latin 
America in 1996. As mentioned, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov began visiting Latin 
American states in 1996 and 1997. Whereas he did visit Cuba, he did not visit 
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Nicaragua.149 During the decade that followed, foreign policy under the Nicaraguan 
administrations of Arnoldo Alemán and Enrique Bolaños emphasized cordial relations 
with the United States.150 
1. Political Ties Resume under Ortega 
It was not until Ortega’s 2007 return to power as elected president that political 
ties between Russia and Nicaragua strengthened. Ortega resumed the ties with Russia that 
had dwindled after the latter withdrew from the region in 1989 and the FSLN’s 
subsequent defeat in Nicaragua’s 1990 presidential election. As proof of strengthened 
political ties between the two countries after Ortega’s return, Nicaragua was one of only a 
very few states besides Russia—and the first in Latin America, before Venezuela—to 
recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after they broke away from 
Georgia in 2008; Nicaragua recognized them without being asked to do so.151  
a. Engagement for Economic Aid or to Counter U.S. Influence 
The Ortega administration may have made this grand political overture to secure 
military equipment and economic support from Russia.152 Blank and Kim mention that 
“Ortega claimed that he was turning to Russia, just as he had done a generation ago, 
because Washington offered nothing to Nicaragua despite requests for military and other 
aid.”153 Indeed, aid from and diplomatic relations with Russia resumed after Nicaragua’s 
recognition of the breakaway Georgian provinces in early September 2008.154 That same 
month, Russia made an immense political overture in return with a visit by then Deputy 
Prime Minister Igor Sechin to Managua.155 Although no longer in the government at 
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present, Sechin is President Putin’s “left hand man,” the head of oil giant Rosneft, and 
#47 on Forbes’s 2015 “World’s Most Powerful People” list—on which Putin himself has 
garnered the #1 spot.156 Thus, the fact of Sechin’s visit to Nicaragua was significant. 
During the visit, he reportedly offered Nicaragua “economic, energy, infrastructure, and 
military assistance.”157 Diplomatic relations continued to increase in November 2008, 
when then Russian President Medvedev met with Ortega on the sidelines of the ALBA 
conference in Caracas, Venezuela.158  
Russian material assistance—as promised by Sechin—came to Nicaragua shortly 
thereafter. When the aforementioned Russian flotilla—including nuclear cruiser Peter the 
Great and destroyer Admiral Chabanenko—conducted the Russian navy’s first surface 
action group deployment to Latin America since 1988 in November and December 2008, 
Admiral Chabanenko made a port visit to Nicaragua to deliver medical and office 
supplies and generators as humanitarian aid. Besides rewarding Ortega’s political 
support, this move may have been a response to the U.S. Navy’s delivery of humanitarian 
aid to Georgia in August 2008. The week after Admiral Chabanenko’s visit, Ortega 
visited Moscow to discuss economic investment.159  
Though it could be that the Ortega administration has increased Nicaragua’s 
political ties with Russia principally for the purpose of gaining Russian economic 
support, one cannot discount that Nicaragua is building relationships with countries with 
which the United States has had poor relations in order to diminish U.S. influence. Jane’s 
comments that Ortega’s Nicaragua “has been keen to build international alliances that 
will act as a counterweight to U.S. influence in its internal affairs, representing a marked 
shift away from the pro-U.S. tendencies of previous administrations in the 1990s and 
                                                 
156 Kathryn Dill, ed., “The World’s Most Powerful People,” Forbes, November 4, 2015, 
http://www.forbes.com/profile/igor-sechin/. 
157 “External Affairs, Nicaragua,” 13. 
158 Izaguirre and Vakulenko, “Russia and Nicaragua: Working Together.” 
159 Dmitry Gorenburg, Russian Naval Deployments: A Return to Global Power Projection or a 




2000s.”160 Ortega’s Nicaragua has befriended the regimes of not only Russia but also 
Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, and even Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya before the latter’s 
overthrow. Under Ortega, Nicaragua joined and became an ardent member of the Hugo 
Chávez-founded ALBA leftist bloc.161  The ALBA—or “Bolivarian”—states have been 
supportive of Russia and other states that counter U.S. interests; they have supported 
Russia with regard to its involvement in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.162 They 
consider Russia, China, and Iran to be “natural allies of the Bolivarian Revolution.”163 As 
such, Ortega has reportedly called Putin “brother president,” as did former Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Ortega in 2012.164 
b. Not Ideological Ties but Political Support 
The “brotherhood” between Ortega’s Nicaragua and Putin’s Russia is geopolitical 
versus ideological.165 Today no shared ideology binds Putin’s Russia and Ortega’s 
regime because neither really has an ideological focus. While the FSLN from 1979 to 
1990 was a “revolutionary mass-organic party…it was increasingly transformed into a 
personal vehicle for Daniel Ortega during its 16 years in opposition.”166 During those 
years, the FSLN created pacts with Nicaraguan conservative politicians and became 
markedly less revolutionary. A number of Sandinista leaders defected, as the party 
became more of a “populist machine.”167 The Sandinista defectors have indicated that 
Ortega’s party now “represents not Sandinista ideology but a new brand termed 
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orteguismo.”168 Thus, as Michael Shifter indicates, “ideology has for Ortega clearly 
taken a back seat to sheer power politics. He appears ready to do whatever is necessary to 
remain in power.”169 Likewise, Putin has made his regime “a non-ideological one….Like 
any political regime, Putin’s Kremlin is doing its best to construct some collective 
identities and to exploit nationalist sentiments or Soviet nostalgia, but the insistence that 
you do not want to be lectured by the United States is not an ideology.”170  
Instead, Russia has geopolitical aims in its relations with Nicaragua and other 
states not in favor with the United States; one is the goal of achieving a multi-polar world 
order. According to Blank, a “craving for status lies at the heart of Russian foreign 
policy….It aims to instrumentalize Latin America as a series of countries or even a weak, 
but still discernible, political bloc to support Russian positions against U.S. policy and 
dominance in world affairs.”171 At the aforementioned 2008 ALBA conference, 
Medvedev openly solicited support for achieving a multi-polar world.172 That same 
month, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Nicaragua—as well as Brazil, Argentina, 
Peru and Ecuador—and promoted the importance of Latin America in developing multi-
polarity in international relations.173 Moreover, when Sechin visited Nicaragua, Cuba, 
and Venezuela in 2008, he reportedly proposed they form an “anti-American alliance” 
with Russia, in response to U.S. defense activities such as BMD system development in 
former Soviet republics.174 Sechin’s proposal seems to align with the views of Aleksandr 
Dugin—preeminent Eurasianist scholar and author of Foundations of Geopolitics.175 
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Dugin has proposed that Russia win “over Europe for an anti-U.S. coalition” and “even 
mentions pulling Latin America from under U.S. influence.”176 Sechin’s stated reason 
reveals Russia’s aim for multi-polarity is apparently a manifestation of the “tit-for-tat 
syndrome,” by which the Russians respond to U.S. encroachment in Russia’s historic 
backyard by doing the same to the United States.177  
Nicaragua has definitely been one to support that Russian aim. In December 2009, 
Ortega “pledged to Russia Nicaragua’s opposition to a ‘unipolar’ world and welcomed 
Russian presence in Latin America.”178 During a visit to the region in March 2015, 
Lavrov thanked the Ortega administration for being instrumental in helping Russia make 
in-roads in the region, including with such regional associations as the Central American 
Integration System (SICA) and CELAC.179 In April 2014, Lavrov visited Nicaragua—as 
well as Cuba, Chile, and Peru—in part to propose a Russia-CELAC visa-free travel 
agreement.180 During his March 2015 tour, he met with senior leaders of the member 
states of SICA in Guatemala; afterward, the Guatemalan foreign minister announced that 
all of the Central American countries would strengthen their cooperation with Russia and 
that Russia would be filing for observer status in SICA.181 Russia ostensibly attempts to 
get involved with numerous regional associations to increase its great power status 
relative to that of the United States.182 As demonstrated with all of the aforementioned 
visits, Nicaragua has been a common denominator for Russia’s engagement in the region. 
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Nicaragua has also been helpful in keeping Russia from international diplomatic 
isolation. During his July 2014 visit to the region for the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa (BRICS) summit in Brazil, Putin also visited Nicaragua, Cuba, and 
Argentina—showing that Russia is not cut off from international relations despite its 
involvement in Crimea and Ukraine but rather “is able to win both friends and 
influence—even in the United States’ own ‘backyard.’”183 Diana Villiers Negroponte 
indicates that Russia is looking for allies that can “provide votes in Russia’s favor at the 
UN General Assembly.”184 Nicaragua has done just that. Besides joining Russia in 
supporting the Georgian breakaway provinces, Nicaragua has voiced support for Russia’s 
policies and actions in Ukraine.185 In March 2014, Nicaragua—alongside only 10 other 
countries including Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Syria, and North Korea—voted against the 
UN resolution affirming the sovereignty of Ukraine, whereas 100 countries supported it 
and 58 abstained.186 Moreover, during Lavrov’s visit to Nicaragua that April, Ortega 
spoke out against sanctions the West emplaced against Russia.187 In turn for such support 
from Nicaragua and other ALBA countries, Russia ostensibly provides them with “an 
influential friend on the United Nations Security Council.”188 
More significantly for Nicaragua, Russia supported Ortega’s electoral victory in 
2006. The Russians reportedly were “helping his campaign and leveling accusations 
against U.S.-backed candidates.”189 Moreover, upon his reelection in 2011, Russia was 
among the various countries—not including the United States—that recognized his 
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victory right away despite opposition protests.190 Now in his second term in this 
millennium, Ortega has had the Nicaraguan Supreme Court pass a ruling enabling him to 
run for a third term, despite it being unconstitutional.191 With Ortega securing his 
foothold, Russia may very well continue to have a stable and reliable ally in the region—
which is especially significant for Russia in light of ongoing instability in Venezuela.192 
2. Security Ties 
Since 2008, military engagements with Nicaragua have been a key facet of 
Russia’s reengagement in Latin America.193 In comparison with the discreet Soviet 
military involvement in Nicaragua in the 1980s, Russian involvement there in the 
contemporary era has been much less discreet. In September 2008 during the Georgia 
crisis, two Russian Tu-160 strategic, nuclear-capable bombers landed in Venezuela but 
did not visit Nicaragua.194 As this trip occurred just days after Nicaragua’s recognition 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence, perhaps Russia had not yet fully warmed up 
to Nicaragua. Regardless, within two weeks, the Russian ambassador to Nicaragua, Igor 
Kondrashev, announced on television that Russia would be modernizing Nicaragua’s 
military hardware—most of which it received from the Soviet Union.195 Moreover, three 
months later—as mentioned—a Russian flotilla visited Nicaragua, as well as Venezuela 
and Cuba, as part of the Russian navy’s first venture to the region since 1988.196 Years 
later, in September 2013, two Russian navy vessels again visited Nicaragua, at Corinto on 
the Pacific Ocean, after first stopping in Cuba.197 The following month, Russian Tu-160 
bombers returned to the region and landed not only in Venezuela but also in 
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Nicaragua.198 This trip was ostensibly part of Russia’s reaction to growth of the U.S.-
NATO BMD program in Eastern Europe.199 The Tu-160s reportedly breached 
Colombian airspace over waters claimed by Nicaragua, which may have been a show of 
political support for Nicaragua.200 At the same time as the Tu-160 deployment, Russian 
Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev visited Managua. During the visit, he and 
the commander of Nicaragua’s armed forces General Julio César Aviles Castillo signed 
an agreement to conduct regular consultations with each other.201 
a. Russia Unlikely to Have Bases in Nicaragua 
Despite initial hype in 2014, Russia has seemingly not sought nor received rights 
to have a base of its own in Nicaragua. In February 2014, when U.S.-Russian relations 
were strained over the crisis in Ukraine, Russian leaders began announcing ostensible 
plans to establish basing rights to some extent in Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela, and a few 
countries in Asia to support Russia’s long-range bomber and naval deployments.202 As 
mentioned, Sánchez has assessed that Russia is unlikely to establish a base in Nicaragua, 
noting that the latter’s government has said that it “is out of the question.”203 Indeed, the 
establishment of a foreign military base in Nicaragua would breach its constitution.204 
After Russian Defense Minister Shoigu’s follow-up visit to those three Latin American 
countries in February 2015, his deputy Anatoly Antonov clarified that Russia does not 
seek actual military bases but rather a series of locations for resupply, maintenance, and 
crew rest for their ships when deployed to the region and for their aircraft when flying 
missions there.205  
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Such maintenance depots would be useful for continued Russian deployments. In 
November 2014—amidst continued tensions over Ukraine—Shoigu had announced that 
Russian military aircraft would conduct recurring flights over the Caribbean and even 
over the Gulf of Mexico.206 To date, there have been no such further flights. Perhaps low 
oil prices since summer 2014 have hindered Russia’s ability to do so, just as high oil 
prices in 2007 enabled Russia to resume its long-range bomber flights after a 15-year 
hiatus.207 Regardless, after Shoigu’s February 2015 visit to Nicaragua, there was no 
mention of any agreement for additional basing rights for Russian bombers. Shoigu did, 
however, sign an agreement with the Nicaraguans that facilitates Russian navy visits to 
the ports of Corinto on the Pacific coast and Bluefields on the Caribbean coast.208 
Airbase and port access aside, the Russian military has established a few new 
military facilities in Nicaragua, as the Soviet military did there in the 1980s. In April 
2013, Russian Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Valery Gerasimov inaugurated a new 
munitions disposal facility there. Then, in June 2014, Russia established a facility for 
maintaining Nicaragua’s ground force vehicles.209 Moreover, Russia reportedly gave 
Nicaragua $26.5 million to build two military hospitals.210 
Meanwhile, Russian military presence for a few projects is potentially 
forthcoming. Russian troops may provide security for the construction of Nicaragua’s 
Interoceanic Grand Canal. Construction reportedly commenced in December 2014.211 An 
agreement between Nicaragua and Russia was to permit Russian naval vessels and 
aircraft to deploy within Nicaragua’s territorial waters during the first half of 2015 to 
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safeguard the canal’s construction.212 Nonetheless, Russia has not yet been involved with 
providing security for the project. In April 2015, Foreign Minister Lavrov announced that 
Russia was prepared to do so but that the two governments had not yet outlined Russia’s 
assistance.213 Currently, construction on the canal is delayed. The Hong Kong Nicaragua 
Canal Development Group, the private Chinese company commissioned with the project, 
announced in November 2015 that further construction would not proceed until late 
2016.214 If the project does proceed and Russia does eventually provide security for it, 
then—according to Blank and Kim—it reportedly may be permitted the “establishment of 
a military base” in Nicaragua for that purpose, which could give Russia “cover for the 
introduction of a host of covert agents and programs….Thus, former government officials 
and opposition figures publicly have articulated their fears that Ortega might turn 
Nicaragua into a Russian base of operations.”215  
Another project that may increase Russian military presence in Nicaragua is the 
potential establishment of a satellite control station there for Russia’s Global Navigation 
Satellite System (GLONASS). The Russian legislature has approved such a plan.216 
During Putin’s July 2014 visit to the region, he reportedly argued for a GLONASS 
station in each country he visited.217 Similar to Blank’s theory about the canal project, he 
posits that the tracking station “will probably become a substitute for the electronic 
tracking center at Lourdes, Cuba, which Moscow gave up a decade ago.”218  
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b. Counter-Narcotics Cooperation 
More certain is Russia’s counter-narcotics cooperation with Nicaragua. While 
Russian FSKN director Viktor Ivanov was touring Latin America in 2012—as mentioned 
in the previous chapter—he met with Nicaraguan officials to solicit cooperation with 
Russia to counter illicit drug trafficking.219 Ivanov succeeded in signing an agreement 
with Nicaragua for technical assistance, information sharing, and operations 
coordination.220 Since then, counter-narcotics cooperation between Russia and Nicaragua 
has certainly had manifestations. In early March 2013, the Nicaraguans broke up a Zetas-
affiliated drug trafficking network that had been shipping cocaine to Russia and Europe. 
The Russians reportedly contributed logistical support to the operation.221 The operation 
resulted in 26 arrests and the seizure of about 1.2 tons of cocaine.222 Later that month, 
Ivanov broke ground on the Russian-funded regional counter-narcotics training center in 
Managua.223 Russians have trained not only Nicaraguan police officers there but also 
officers from El Salvador and Guatemala.224 Reportedly, 130 Russian counter-narcotics 
instructors are permanently stationed there and conduct combined patrols with 
Nicaraguan officers. Farah contends that increases in Russian organized crime in Central 
America and drug trafficking from Central America to Russia have accompanied the 
increase in Russian state presence there. As mentioned earlier, he also claims that the 
purpose of the training center is to supplant U.S. counter-drug initiatives in the region.225 
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To the contrary, U.S. officials do not see Russia’s counter-narcotics activities in 
Nicaragua as counter to U.S. efforts. Former U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua Phyllis 
Powers reportedly “underscored that the Russian counter-narcotic assistance to Central 
America was just a complementary collaboration to the work of the DEA in the 
country.”226 The United States continues to support counter-narcotics efforts in 
Nicaragua with funding and information sharing. For example, in 2014, the United States 
funded 20 interdiction operations of the Nicaraguan National Police on the Pan-American 
Highway.227 That year, the United States also reportedly provided $4 million toward 
“capacity-building projects” and donated equipment such as boats and thermal 
binoculars, while shifting some funding from direct support to the Nicaraguan 
government to indirect support through non-governmental programs due to accountability 
issues.228 For its part, Nicaragua is not choosing between its Russian and U.S. counter-
narcotics partners, preferring instead to diversify its sources of assistance.229 Plus, in 
November 2013, Nicaragua invited both Russia and the United States—among others—
to conduct counter-narcotics patrols in the waters around San Andrés Island that the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) had just awarded to Nicaragua instead of Colombia. 
Despite the political undertones of the invitation, one can see the invitation as valid due 
to the island being an emerging narcotics staging point.230 
c. Military Equipment Modernization 
That ICJ decision—which gives Nicaragua a larger exclusive economic zone to 
patrol—in addition to Nicaragua’s other enduring territorial disputes, is guiding the 
country’s efforts to procure major military hardware. Nevertheless, Nicaragua’s budget is 
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too limited, and plans for major purchases have fallen through or are unconfirmed. In 
February 2015 Nicaragua was reportedly in negotiations with Russia to purchase used 
MiG-29 “Fulcrum” fighter aircraft; yet, the following month Nicaraguan officials 
announced they were no longer seeking to procure the fighters—probably due to their 
inability to cover the high purchase and maintenance costs. Moreover, it is as of yet 
unconfirmed whether the Nicaraguan navy has ordered a pair of Molniya-class corvettes 
and four Mirach-class patrol boats from a Russian company.231 Nicaragua has gained a 
few pieces of hardware for coastal patrol and counter-drug purposes. Spain donated four 
patrol vessels to the Nicaraguan Naval Force in 2007 for coastal patrol, while the United 
States underwrote the refurbishment of three Nicaraguan patrol boats in 2010. In 2009, 
Russia provided one of two Mi-17 transport helicopters that it offered to Nicaragua.232 
That Mi-17 is for counter-narcotics operations or possibly for transporting high-ranking 
officials.233 
Meanwhile, Russia has assisted Nicaragua with modernizing its ground force 
equipment, to an extent. In fulfillment of its aforementioned September 2008 promise, 
Russia has reportedly assisted Nicaragua with its efforts to refurbish its Soviet-era 
artillery and armored vehicles. Moreover, by 2014, Russia had reportedly transferred to 
Nicaragua at least a small number of BTR-70M armored personnel carriers and BMP-1 
light tanks.234 Nonetheless, one sees a distinct contrast between the vast amounts of 
military hardware that the Soviets provided to Nicaragua during the 1980s and the 
comparatively limited hardware that Russia has provided to Nicaragua in recent years. 
3. Economic Ties 
Russian economic aid to Nicaragua after the Soviet Union’s demise in 1991 was a 
significant reduction from the Soviet aid that had kept the FSLN regime afloat during the 
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1980s.235 While Nicaragua’s economy grew in the two decades after the Contra War, it 
remained reliant on foreign assistance.236 Reportedly, “decreasing remittances, capital 
flight and an unsustainable national budget led Ortega to seek aid from Russia.”237 
a. Resumption of Aid 
Russian assistance resumed after Nicaragua’s recognition of the Georgian 
breakaway provinces in September 2008.238 As mentioned, the Russian navy delivered a 
shipment of humanitarian assistance to Nicaragua in December 2008.239 Most 
significantly, Russia wrote off the $3 billion of debt that Nicaragua had borrowed from 
the Soviet Union.240 During Sechin’s return visit in July 2009, the two sides signed an 
agreement for visa-free travel, while Nicaraguan oil company Petronic signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the Russian National Oil Consortium for oil and 
energy cooperation.241 Moreover, from 2011 until 2014, Russia was donating about 
100,000 tons of flour annually and hundreds of public buses and taxis to Nicaragua.242 
b. Increased but Tenuous Commerce 
One can see in Figures 1 and 2 that after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–
2009, bilateral trade increased between Russia and Nicaragua. The aforementioned 
donated wheat and vehicles account for most of the increase in Nicaraguan imports from 
Russia from 2011 to 2013; fertilizer imports also increased markedly.243 By 2014, 
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Nicaraguan imports of all three had plummeted.244 Midway through 2014, Russia 
stopped donating wheat to Nicaragua in favor of selling it instead.245 These data support 
Ellis’s contention that ongoing low oil prices since summer 2014, as well as economic 
sanctions against Russia from the United States and Europe since 2014, are likely to limit 
the resources that Russia has available to finance projects in Latin America.246 
Figure 1.  Nicaraguan Imports from Russia 
 
Source: “UN Comtrade,” UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, accessed 
March 12, 2016, http://comtrade.un.org/data/. 
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Figure 2.  Nicaraguan Exports to Russia 
 
Source: “UN Comtrade,” UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, accessed 
March 12, 2016, http://comtrade.un.org/data/. 
After Putin’s July 2014 visit, Russia approached Nicaragua to secure more 
imports of Nicaraguan fruits, vegetables, coffee, and beef since Russia banned the import 
of those commodities from Europe.247 Groundnuts, beef, and coffee were indeed 
Nicaragua’s top exports to Russia that year; yet, those products were also the top exports 
the year before, and total exports stayed roughly the same between the two years. When 
2015 trade data become available, it will be interesting to see whether they indicate a 
significant increase in food exports to Russia. As a side note, the spike in Nicaraguan 
exports to Russia in 2001 consisted almost entirely of sugar.248 
c. Comparatively Insignificant Economic Ties 
Altogether, commercial activities between Russia and Nicaragua have been 
relatively miniscule. Whereas Nicaragua exported a paltry $19.9 million of goods to 
Russia and imported a mere $33.4 million of Russian goods in 2014, Nicaragua exported 
$2.8 billion of goods to the United States and imported $1.1 billion of U.S. goods that 
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year. Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–2009, the United States has persevered as 
Nicaragua’s top trading partner—though neck and neck with Venezuela until 2014. In 
2014, Mexico was Nicaragua’s second largest trading partner, while Nicaraguan imports 
of Chinese goods in 2014 were in third place for a total of $625 million.249 Due to the 
privileged access to the U.S. export market that the Dominican Republic-Central America 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) provides, “Nicaragua has become the second fastest 
growing exporter of apparel to the United States.”250 Russia’s insignificant trade with 
Nicaragua mirrors its insignificant trade with Latin America writ large. Russian trade 
with Latin America reportedly increased from $3 billion in 2000 to $24 billion in 2013; 
in stark contrast, Chinese trade with the region was about $260 billion in 2013.251  
Moreover, as mentioned, Russia’s ability to finance projects—including its 
possible future participation in the Nicaraguan canal project—is limited due to ongoing 
low oil prices and economic sanctions from the West.252 Low oil prices have mostly 
impacted the revenues of the central government and thus its ability to subsidize its 
recession-riddled economy. The sanctions have most significantly limited Russian oil and 
gas companies’ ability to finance investments in foreign markets.253 Negroponte adds 
that the sanctions will limit Latin American financial institutions’ willingness to “enter 
joint ventures with Russian banks for fear of becoming tainted and thus subject to U.S. 
Treasury penalties. We might expect continued declarations of prospective deals, but 
should remain skeptical about the capacity to implement those agreements.”254 Even 
before the problems of 2014, Russian financing in Nicaragua was apparently limited. 
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Reported foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from Russia to Nicaragua this 
millennium—at least through 2012—have been nonexistent.255 
In contrast, some of the other BRICS countries have made some less tenuous 
investments in Nicaragua in recent years. For instance, Brazilian companies are financing 
the construction of a hydroelectric power plant at Tumarín.256 Meanwhile, in addition to 
the Nicaraguan canal project, a separate Chinese company, China Great Wall Industries 
Corporation—with Chinese banks’ financing—is reportedly building Nicaragua’s first- 
and second-ever communications satellites. The first is to be in orbit by 2017.257 
C. CONCLUSION 
Contrasts are apparent between Soviet ties with the FSLN regime during the 
1980s and Russian ties with Nicaragua in the contemporary era. In the 1980s, the Soviet 
Union did develop political, military, and economic ties with the nascent FSLN regime, 
but the Soviet Union refrained from committing itself fully to it and tried to mostly keep 
its involvement discreet. The Soviets provided the new regime most of the military and 
economic support it needed to counter U.S. efforts to undermine it, while not creating 
another dependency like Cuba or allowing the Cubans or the FSLN to drag the Soviet 
Union into a conflict with the United States. While Russia has provided Nicaragua some 
material security-related and economic support in the contemporary era and its assistance 
is less discreet now, its support is much less substantial than the support the Soviets had 
provided. Moreover, the United States and other countries are much more important to 
Nicaragua economically and have also provided it some security-related assistance. 
Overall, one cannot say that the Soviet “bear”—defined by vital military and economic 
assistance to the regime—has returned to Nicaragua. 
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The closeness of Nicaraguan-Russian ties is a reflection more of their mutual 
political support and certain aspects of their security ties. While ideology is not important 
for them today, the two provide each other an important ally in countering U.S./Western 
influence. Meanwhile, Managua has enabled Moscow to use Nicaragua to show Russian 
strategic presence in the U.S. periphery—most poignantly by allowing its strategic, 
nuclear-capable bombers to land in Nicaragua. That military presence is purposely much 
less discreet than Soviet military presence in Nicaragua was supposed to be; Nicaragua is 
enabling Russia to use “power projection in an attempt to erode U.S. leadership and 
challenge U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere.”258 Meanwhile, although Russian 
deployments and basing talks may seem fleeting, the two countries’ counter-narcotics 
cooperation in the past few years illustrates that they may maintain enduring ties in such 
limited areas. Yet, their counter-narcotics cooperation seemingly does not undermine 
U.S. efforts in the region and involves a limited presence of Russian personnel in the 
country, like the limited Soviet personnel presence there during the 1980s—only without 
the large presence of Cuban advisors now. Nonetheless, such aspects of Nicaraguan-
Russian ties today as their counter-narcotics cooperation and Russian bombers landing in 
Nicaragua may show that Russia’s ties with Nicaragua today are closer than its ties with 
Cuba. Farah says that the FSLN regime is “arguably Russia’s closest ally in Latin 
America.”259 All of these facets of the bilateral relationship today portend implications 
for U.S. policy, which this thesis will discuss in Chapter IV. 
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III. CUBAN-RUSSIAN TIES 
Next, this thesis examines the closeness of ties between Russia and Cuba today. 
Russian-Cuban ties today pale in comparison, in particular, with the magnitude of Soviet-
Cuban ties during their relatively halcyon years of the 1970s and most of the 1980s. This 
chapter first examines Soviet-Cuban ties throughout the Cold War and then delves into 
Russian-Cuban ties in the post-Cold War era; for each period, the thesis assesses the 
closeness of bilateral political, security, and economic ties. 
A. SOVIET-CUBAN TIES IN THE COLD WAR 
Cuba had a pre-revolutionary past similar to Nicaragua’s. The United States 
administered Cuba from 1898 to 1902 after winning the Spanish-American War. In 1902, 
the United States granted Cuba its independence but reserved the authority to intervene 
militarily to maintain order in Cuba with the Platt Amendment, as codified in the 1901 
Cuban Constitution. Indeed, by 1921 the United States did intervene in Cuba on three 
occasions.260 Moreover, the United States established a lasting presence on the island 
with the Guantanamo Bay naval facility built in Cuba in 1903 based on a deal with 
Havana.261 In 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt declared a “Good Neighbor Policy,” by 
which the United States would no longer intervene militarily in Latin America. Relations 
became markedly neighborly between the United States and Latin America through the 
end of World War II, after which anti-imperialist—mostly anti-U.S.—sentiment emerged 
in Latin America, including among Cuban nationalists.262 Having been influenced by 
anti-imperialist sentiments since his law school days in the late 1940s, Fidel Castro had 
become a fervent nationalist and came to see Cuban President Fulgencio Batista—
“because of his U.S. backing and his staunch support of U.S. anticommunism in the 
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OAS—as an agent of imperialism.”263 Fidel and his brother Raúl launched a failed attack 
against Batista’s army in 1953 after Batista had seized power through a coup in 1952. 
Batista exiled the Castros to Mexico, where they met Ernesto “Ché” Guevara, an 
internationalist revolutionary from Argentina. Together, the three of them and a small 
assault force returned to Cuba in 1956 and fought guerrilla warfare for the next two years 
to overthrow Batista’s regime.264 
Fidel Castro’s resistance movement was not aligned with the Soviets before the 
revolution.265 In 1902, the Russian Empire had instituted diplomatic relations with 
Cuba.266 The Soviet Union continued diplomatic relations with the island. Yet, the Soviet 
Union had seen the Caribbean as an area in which U.S. influence precluded communist 
advancement.267 As such, the local Soviet-affiliated communists in Cuba followed Soviet 
guidance to compromise with their country’s respective leader.268 Under Batista’s 
administration as elected president during the early 1940s, the communist Partido 
Socialista Popular (PSP) had held a ministerial post and administered the official 
Confederation of Cuban Workers.269 Subsequently, the Soviets ended diplomatic 
relations with Cuba after Batista took over as dictator through the aforementioned coup in 
1952. Yet, Soviet leadership was disinterested in Fidel Castro’s nascent rebellion against 
the Batista regime, even after Castro’s group attacked the Moncada Barracks in 1953 and 
later sparked a guerrilla war.270 The Soviet-aligned PSP did not join Castro’s July 26th 
Movement until the last minute—in 1958—with insignificant support in helping to defeat 
Batista’s regime.271 Batista fled Cuba on January 1, 1959.272 Even after Castro’s victory, 
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the Soviets and the PSP were cautious in embracing him; they “regarded him as another 
petit-bourgeois leader, more promising than most, but still a man who might make his 
peace with the United States and continue the social structure essentially unchanged.”273  
1. Cuba and the Superpowers after the Revolution 
Only upon the decline of U.S. relations with the nascent Castro regime starting in 
1959 did the Soviets see Castro’s revolution as “a genuine social revolution in Latin 
America, seemingly tolerated by the United States.”274 Despite early disagreement within 
the U.S. State Department about whether the United States could cope with Castro being 
in power, “by 1959, State Department officials concluded that Castro would have to go 
and reviewed policy options in mid-1960.”275 In 1959, the Soviets had begun selling 
arms to Cuba.276 The following February, the two countries established a trade agreement 
of sugar for equipment, even before the United States broke relations with Cuba.277 Then, 
in June 1960, Cuba began buying Russian crude oil, which the U.S.-owned refineries on 
Cuba would not refine. In turn, Castro nationalized the refineries. The United States 
promptly stopped buying Cuban sugar.278 The Soviets undergirded Cuba by promising to 
buy all the sugar that was meant for the United States. The Castro regime continued 
expropriating U.S. properties.279 In September 1960, the Soviets began exporting tanks to 
Cuba, followed by artillery and other military hardware; in addition, Soviet military 
advisors began going to Cuba.280 By late 1960, the Soviets had additionally begun 
sending MiG-15 fighter training aircraft to Cuba.281 That December, the U.S. 
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administration ceased nearly all exports to Cuba and decided to import no Cuban sugar at 
all in 1961. Formal diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba dissolved in 
January 1961.282 All the while, Castro had still not declared himself or the revolution to 
be socialist or Marxist. John C. Chasteen states, “Never—not as a student radical in the 
1940s, nor as a guerrilla leader in the 1950s—was Castro close to the Moscow-line 
Cuban Communist Party.”283  
Nonetheless, Castro changed his stated political leanings in 1961—ultimately 
securing deeper Soviet support. In April 1961, a day after U.S. airstrikes on Cuba and the 
day before the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro declared the revolution to be 
socialist.284 Then, in December 1961, he announced that “he was a devout Marxist-
Leninist and would remain so until the day he died.”285 Jacque Lévesque notes that all 
experts on Cuba hold that Castro made both of those declarations to secure military 
protection from the Soviet Union as a member of the socialist camp.286 In February 1962, 
the Soviets learned that President Kennedy had ordered that a contingency plan be 
written to plan for the event of another invasion of Cuba. In response, a Pravda editorial 
relayed an implicit threat of retaliation to countries that hosted U.S. military bases, in the 
event that the United States were to threaten Cuba.287 According to Graham Allison and 
Philip Zelikow, relations between Havana and Moscow did hit a few obstacles in March 
1962, when Castro attacked the Moscow-aligned leader of the PSP, Anibal Escalante, and 
attempted to gain economic aid from China. Nonetheless, the Soviets decided to increase 
their commitment to the Castro regime. In April that year, they delivered SA-2 surface-
to-air missile (SAM) systems, coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs), military trainers, 
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and a regiment of troops to Cuba.288 Moreover, the Soviets were shipping the Cubans a 
number of MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters.289 
In May 1962, Khrushchev decided to send a larger military group with nuclear-
capable ballistic missiles to Cuba—but not at Castro’s request. Castro had expressed that 
he did not want to allow any country to set up a military base on Cuba, so as to not 
provoke a U.S. attack.290  Nonetheless, “in the end, Castro did accept the missiles. But he 
and his colleagues always said that they did this only because they felt obliged to help the 
Soviet Union in its desire to change the global balance of power.”291 For Khrushchev’s 
part, according to his 1970 memoirs, keeping the United States from undertaking 
“precipitous military action against Castro’s government” was the principal reason for his 
decision to send the missiles but that the missiles would also have leveled the playing 
field with the United States.292 According to James Blight and Philip Brenner, “More 
recent testimony from former Soviet officials confirms the finding that at least one major 
Soviet objective in placing missiles in Cuba was to secure it against a possible U.S. 
invasion.”293 In September 1962, the Soviets began shipping to Cuba medium-range 
ballistic missiles (MRBMs), IL-28 medium bombers, and top-of-the-line MiG-21 fighters 
with air-to-air missiles.294 Unconfirmed to the United States at the time of the crisis, in 
October, nuclear warheads and bombs had arrived for the MRBMs, IL-28s, CDCMs, and 
short-range rockets, as well as for the awaited intermediate-range ballistic missiles that 
were on their way to Cuba too late to skirt the U.S. blockade emplaced on October 24.295 
Moreover, over 40,000 Soviet ground troops and technicians were in Cuba by that 
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time.296 Furthermore, Khrushchev reportedly told Guevara that he had authorized the 
deployment of the Soviets’ Baltic Fleet—11 submarines and more than 22 surface 
vessels—if need be.297 
Nonetheless, the tense standoff of the Cuban Missile Crisis ended in negotiations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The latter conceded to withdrawing its 
nuclear-capable missiles. The United States pledged to refrain from invading Cuba.298 
Moreover, it secretly agreed to withdraw a unit of antiquated MRBMs from Turkey.299 
Having been left out of the negotiations, Castro was outraged to have learned of 
Khrushchev and Kennedy’s October 27 decision over the radio on October 28, alongside 
the rest of the Cuban population. The Soviets told Castro that there was no time to 
consult him. Castro and the Cubans felt betrayed.300 Blight and Brenner say, “Literally 
overnight, the Cuban perception of the Soviets shifted from that of savior to traitor. Just 
as Judas had betrayed Jesus ironically with a kiss, the Soviets had betrayed Cuba, with 
equal irony, with their bogus offer of a boundless fraternal commitment to Cuba’s 
security.”301  
2. Ties from the Missile Crisis until Gorbachev 
For most of the decade after the Missile Crisis, Cuban-Soviet ties would remain 
turbulent. Nevertheless, after the two sides reconciled before the turn of the decade, their 
ties grew to be quite close until nearly the end of the Cold War, as the Soviets pervaded 
Cuba’s state and economy. The following subsections detail those early stormy relations 
and subsequent tightly knit ties thematically by political, security, and economic ties. 
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a. Turbulent, Then Reconciled Political Ties 
After its perceived betrayal at the hands of the Soviets, the Castro regime publicly 
criticized the Soviets. The regime criticized the Soviets as being too submissive to the 
United States in light of the latter’s involvement in areas such as Vietnam and only 
concerned with the national security of the Soviet Union itself and directing other 
countries’ communist parties. Criticism increased after Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei 
Kosygin replaced the deposed Khrushchev in his first secretary and premier positions, 
respectively, in 1964.302 Continued U.S. covert action against the Castro regime from 
1963 to 1965 “reinforced the Cubans’ conviction that the United States was a mortal 
enemy and that Moscow’s efforts to placate Washington were antithetical to Cuban 
interests.”303 In January 1966, Havana hosted a Tricontinental Conference of over 500 
delegates from Latin America, Africa, and Asia—in an attempt to establish a Cuba-led 
alternative to the Soviets’ network of communist parties that would be dedicated to 
armed revolt anywhere possible. At the conference, Castro criticized the Soviet Union’s 
ostensibly meager support to North Vietnam, as well as Latin American communist 
parties for their inactivity in advancing socialist liberation.304 Besides criticizing other 
local communist parties, Castro “had begun purging pro-Moscow elements from the 
Communist Party of Cuba [PCC]…By thus radicalising Latin American communism and 
committing it to revolution, Castro succeeded mainly in alarming noncommunist political 
forces and undermining Soviet diplomatic efforts throughout the region.”305 Castro had 
merged the PSP with his 26th of July Movement in 1965 to form the PCC, but 
“Fidelistas,” rather than former PSP members, dominated the party.306  
Ties took a marked downturn in 1967, as the Soviets responded. By early that 
year, Brezhnev pushed for “bringing the Cubans into line….In a message sent by the 
Soviet leadership…the Cubans were told that they had provoked the United States 
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repeatedly and that, should the United States decide to move militarily against Cuba (as 
well they might), the Cubans should not expect the Russians to lift a finger on their 
behalf.”307 The Brezhnev administration cited particular displeasure from Guevara’s 
attempt to incite armed revolt in Bolivia.308 In June 1967, the Castro regime refused to 
follow the Soviet bloc in breaking diplomatic ties with Israel in light of the Six-Day War; 
Castro identified with Israel’s struggle. Moreover, Castro criticized the Soviets’ 
abandonment of the Arabs—a reminder of the Soviets’ betrayal of Cuba in 1962.309 
Then, at an August 1967 Havana-hosted conference of the Organization of Latin 
American Solidarity (OLAS)—a group of revolutionary movements—Cuba made clear 
to the Soviets that it had its own foreign policy of continuing to engage in revolution, 
even when it would have to do so against Soviet-backed elements.310 Due to Castro’s 
intransigence, the Soviets began curbing oil deliveries to the island, especially in late 
1967. Until then, the Soviet Union had been fulfilling 99.3 percent of Cuba’s oil import 
needs, but that year, Soviet deliveries began falling short of Cuban oil demand.311 As a 
result, by early January 1968, Cuba had to embrace widespread oil rationing.312 Later 
that month, Raúl Castro accused a “microfaction” in the PCC of conspiring with the 
Soviets to remove the Castro regime.313 Raúl had the leader of the ring, Moscow-aligned 
Aníbal Escalante and 34 others imprisoned, seemingly to show Russia that the Castro 
regime would not allow it to determine Cuba’s domestic and foreign policies.314  
Still, a series of setbacks led the Castro regime to reconcile with the Soviets in 
mid-1968. Failing to incite a revolution in Bolivia, Ché Guevara met his demise there in 
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October 1967 at the hands of the Bolivian military.315 Kevin Ginter says, “His death 
symbolized the failure of Cuba’s strategy in Latin America and would lead to a major 
turning-point for Cuban-Soviet relations and Cuba’s Latin America policy.”316 
Meanwhile, economic woes afflicted Cuba’s resolve. In January 1968, Castro had to 
implement oil rationing in light of the aforementioned shortage of Soviet deliveries. 
Moreover, in March 1968, Moscow only partially fulfilled a deal with Havana to increase 
bilateral trade.317 Cuba felt “a sense of growing political isolation and economic 
vulnerability, which in turn translated into intensified security concerns….Cuba’s 
pragmatism led it to reconfigure its international priorities.”318 It became willing to 
cooperate with governments pursuing liberal reforms, not just radical regimes.319 In July 
1968, Castro delivered a speech indicating that “Cuba was ready to live and let live with 
the Soviets.”320  
Cuban-Soviet political rapprochement proceeded thereafter. Castro decided to 
publicly support the Soviet Union’s August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, as well as 
the Brezhnev Doctrine released the following month.321 Cuba ceased challenging the 
Soviets on international political matters. The Cubans supported the Soviets’ policy not 
only in Czechoslovakia but also in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Poland in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Moreover, they supported the Soviet Union in its antagonism with 
the People’s Republic of China. Cuba became as loyal to the Soviet Union as the Eastern 
European Soviet bloc countries.322 Cuban foreign policy interests converged with those 
of the Soviet Union “and culminated in their joint intervention in Angola and Ethiopia in 
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the mid-1970s.”323 The next section addresses the topic of Cuban troop deployments in 
more detail. Meanwhile, “the Soviets…took advantage of Castro’s weakened position to 
insist on greater policy harmony and less Cuban ‘adventurism’ in the Western 
Hemisphere.”324 Thus, in the 1970s, Cuba decreased its support to revolutionary groups 
elsewhere.325 Nonetheless, Cuba did support revolutionary movements in Central 
America and in Grenada. As touched on in the previous chapter, “with regard to Central 
America and the Caribbean, it is clear that Cuba had acted independently and as a kind of 
revolutionary tour guide and mentor for the USSR.”326 Domestically, the Soviet Union 
reorganized Cuba’s government after it had to bail out the latter economically in 1970. 
The Soviets then reorganized the PCC and the entire bureaucracy.327 To sum it up, as 
Robert Packenham wrote in 1986, “Domestically, since 1970 the Cuban polity, economy, 
and society have increasingly been reorganized along Soviet lines. In the international 
sphere, particularly since 1968, the Cuban government has accepted the Soviet 
government as its ‘senior partner’ in foreign policy.”328 The following two sub-sections 
highlight Soviet pervasiveness in Cuban activities. 
b. Security Ties 
After the Missile Crisis, Cubans had doubted Soviet commitment to their 
protection. Blight and Brenner say, “The Cubans would never fully trust the Soviets 
again for the security of their island.”329 For what it is worth, though, First Deputy 
Chairman Anastas Mikoyan conveyed to Castro in November 1962 that the Soviet Union 
would provide the Cubans the weapons it needed for its defense but that it was not 
willing to fight the United States in a nuclear war on Cuba’s behalf or over any other 
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matter.330 During the early to mid-1960s, the Soviets did provide the Cubans some more 
tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and patrol vessels. Even during the most politically tumultuous 
years of 1966 to 1968, the Soviets provided the Cubans some equipment for their own 
defense such as a handful of transport aircraft and some MRLs and amphibious vehicles. 
Yet, it did not provide any new advanced systems.331 Meanwhile, the Soviets continued 
to use Cuba for their own defense purposes during the 1960s; namely, in 1964, the 
Soviets broke ground on the Lourdes SIGINT facility, with which they could reportedly 
collect on U.S. communications and military activities including naval deployments and 
rocket launches.332 In addition to the military personnel working at the facility, the 
Soviets maintained a brigade including motorized rifle battalions and a tank battalion—
roughly 2,600 troops—near Havana333; the brigade was responsible for protecting the 
facility.334 
By the early 1970s after the reconciliation, Cuba ostensibly began to trust the 
Soviet Union again for its defense. In particular, after Castro’s visit to Moscow in 1972, 
he reportedly felt confident that the Soviet Union would protect Cuba against the United 
States, if necessary.335 From 1972 to 1974, the Soviets provided the Cubans several MiG-
21 fighters with air-to-air missiles and fast-attack boats with anti-ship missiles.336 By 
1975, the Soviets had a contingent of about 2,000 additional military personnel on Cuba; 
most were likely responsible for advising the Cubans on Soviet military equipment, 
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conducting other training, and collaborating with Cuban intelligence.337 Meanwhile, by 
1975, the Soviet navy had been deploying reconnaissance-variant Tu-95 aircraft to 
Havana on three to four iterations per year to collect on U.S. exercises and other military 
activities during tense political times, and Soviet navy combat vessels would conduct 
periodic visits to Cuba while deployed to the Caribbean.338 Moreover, Soviet intelligence 
ships would routinely stop in at Cuba while deployed to collect along the U.S. East Coast, 
and the Soviets kept a salvage and rescue vessel stationed in Cuba as well.339 
Starting in 1975, the Soviets revitalized the Cuban military, converting it from a 
self-defense force into the most heavily armed offensive force in Latin America that 
could “project power well beyond Cuba’s shores.”340 Over the next decade and a half, the 
Soviets delivered tremendous amounts of military hardware to Cuba including more 
advanced systems than those the Cubans previously had. In addition to receiving further 
MiG-21s, SA-2 missiles, artillery pieces, tanks, and boats, the Cubans received advanced 
MiG-23 fighter/ground-attack aircraft and MiG-29 fighters with beyond-visual-range air-
to-air missiles; SA-3, SA-6, and SA-13 SAM systems; SA-7 MANPADS and then the 
more advanced SA-14 and SA-16 MANPADS; Mi-24 attack helicopters; and transport 
aircraft.341 As of 1981, the number of Soviet military personnel in the contingent of 
advisers was up to about 2,400 to train the Cubans on their new equipment and to 
maintain it.342 Mervyn Bain offers that the advanced Soviet hardware that the Cubans 
received, as well as a 1984 agreement for 25 years of cooperation, was compensation for 
the Cubans’ joint operations with the Soviet military in Africa.343 
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As noted, starting in the mid-1970s, the Cubans joined the Soviets in operations in 
Africa, notably in Angola and Ethiopia.344 Cole Blasier says, regarding Cuba and the 
Soviet Union, “Never before had the two countries engaged in combined military 
operations. The Cubans supplied most of the troops and the USSR the field commanders, 
combat advisers, weapons, and financial support.”345 By 1979, Cuba had an estimated 
34,000 military technicians deployed to less-developed countries (LDCs)—33,000 in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, the Soviet bloc had only about 16,000 deployed to 
LDCs, with only about 4,000 of them deployed to Sub-Saharan Africa.346 By 1982, the 
number of Cuban troops and advisers deployed had skyrocketed to an estimated 70,000 in 
23 countries.347 Regarding whether the Cuban troops were merely Soviet proxies, 
Packenham offers, “Many commentators maintain that Cuba's foreign policy reflects 
Cuba's own interests. However, it is not plausible that a country of Cuba’s size, location 
and precarious economy would, in its own interests, have 70,000 troops and military 
advisers in 23 countries around the world, mostly in Africa and the Middle East, where 
the troops are Cuban but the officers” Soviet.348 Yet, the Cubans were not entirely 
puppets of the Soviets. As noted, the Cubans seemingly guided the Soviets in their joint 
involvement in Central America and the Caribbean.349 Moreover, the Cubans 
spearheaded the efforts in support of the Popular Movement for the National Liberation 
of Angola in 1975—with which Ché Guevara had developed ties in 1965—whereas the 
Soviets were hesitant to support it.350 In contrast, in Ethiopia in 1978, “the USSR took 
command, in a manner of speaking, of the defense of the Ethiopian government and 
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persuaded the Cubans to bring in seventeen thousand troops, many from Angola.”351 Yet, 
the Soviet military contingent in Ethiopia was comprised of a mere one thousand 
advisers.352 Blasier notes that one may argue that the Cubans were proxies of the Soviets 
in Ethiopia; nevertheless, he says, “But even there, the Cubans could not have been 
forced to fight against their will.”353 
c. Economic Ties 
After 1970, Soviet influence pervaded the Cuban economy as well. That year, 
Cuba’s economy suffered “severe developmental dislocations as a result of its 
unsuccessful (and, said many observers, foolish) attempt to bring in an unprecedented 10 
million ton sugar harvest in 1970.”354 As a result, Cuba truly came to depend on the 
Soviets more than ever for aid.355 As Packenham notes, that same year, the Soviets 
conducted the aforementioned reorganization of Cuba’s bureaucracy and established the 
Cuban-Soviet Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Collaboration. The 
Commission orchestrated the activities of Cuba’s trade, industries, mining, and 
agricultural ministries and agencies. Soviet technicians flooded into Cuba in the early 
1970s to guide the provision of Soviet assistance. By 1972, Cuba had joined the Soviet 
bloc’s COMECON group and subsequently aligned its own five-year economic plans 
with those of the Soviet Union.356  
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union subsidized its trade with Cuba to undergird the 
latter’s economy. It “provided weapon systems, oil, and finished goods in exchange for 
sugar at artificially high prices….thus demonstrating its political and military support for 
a nation under U.S. economic sanctions. The trade for sugar provided a veil of legitimacy 
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for this exchange.”357 Overall bilateral trade increased from 961 million Cuban pesos in 
1968 to 1.2 billion pesos in 1970, to 4.8 billion in 1978, and then up to 9.9 billion in 
1985.358 From then until the end of the decade, Cuba’s trade with the Soviet Union 
reportedly accounted for about 70 percent of Cuba’s overall trade359; trade with the other 
COMECON countries accounted for about another 15 percent.360 Moreover, the Cubans 
supposedly accumulated a debt of about $32 billion to the Soviet Union.361 Thus, Cuba’s 
economy was deeply entrenched with and dependent on that of the Soviet Union. Yuri 
Pavlov says, “The relationship with Cuba was the biggest single expenditure of the USSR 
on a friendly political regime, amounting to hundreds of millions of tons of oil and other 
raw materials, machinery, equipment, and foodstuff.”362 
3. Ties under Gorbachev and the End of Soviet Support 
In the final years of the Cold War, however, Cuban-Soviet ties deteriorated. After 
Gorbachev’s initiation of “new thinking,” glasnost, and perestroika in the Soviet Union 
in the late 1980s, he faced difficulties justifying the Soviet Union’s close relationship 
with a Cuba that refused to reform. Indeed, in a speech to the Congress of People’s 
Deputies of the Soviet Union on April 5, 1989, Castro described why Cuba did not need 
Gorbachev’s reforms.363 He clung doggedly to Marxism-Leninism, emphasizing “the 
need to fight for socialism ‘to the last drop of blood’ and argued against multiparty 
systems and the market economy.”364 Moreover, as in the aftermath of the Missile Crisis, 
Moscow was embracing a conciliatory approach toward Washington, thus diminishing 
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“the geostrategic importance of Cuba for Moscow.”365 As noted in the previous chapter, 
by 1989, Gorbachev began cooperating with Bush to resolve the Central American 
conflicts and stopped consulting Castro on such matters.366 Further, the Soviets insisted 
that the Cubans, as well as the FSLN regime, stop supplying arms to any group in Latin 
America; nonetheless, both continued providing arms to guerrillas in El Salvador in 
1989.367  
Meanwhile, Cuban-Soviet security ties began diminishing as the Soviet Union 
was coming undone. Between 1989 and 1991, the Cubans received 12 MiG-29 fighters 
but had probably placed an order for more that would go unfulfilled; the same happened 
to a partially fulfilled order for torpedo-capable patrol boats.368 Moreover, by 1989, 
Soviet navy reconnaissance aircraft deployments had become only about half as frequent 
as in previous years.369 Finally, on September 11, 1991, Gorbachev broadcast—in a press 
conference with the U.S. secretary of state—that the Soviet Union was pulling its troops 
out of Cuba, “only a matter of days after the defeat of the ‘August coup’ in Moscow that 
had simultaneously ended the power of Cuba’s closest friends in the Soviet ruling 
elite.”370 Nonetheless, the Lourdes SIGINT facility remained open, and the Soviets were 
even upgrading its capabilities in 1990.371 
At the same time, as the Soviet economy deteriorated, economic assistance to 
Cuba diminished. A new bilateral way forward in December 1990 entailed reduced 
subsidies, credits, and aid. In the first half of 1991, Soviet exports to Cuba were 
comprised mostly of oil; by then, the Soviets were no longer exporting staple food items 
to the island as they had previously.372 Despite Soviet economic difficulties, however, 
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“democratic political forces in the Kremlin who demanded an end to support for Cuba, 
faced the opposition of Gorbachev himself, who maintained the views held by his 
predecessors that the political and strategic benefits from close cooperation with Cuba 
had justified the massive economic expenditure involved in preserving this de facto 
alliance.”373 Nonetheless, by 1992, all economic aid had dried up; even oil shipments 
decreased by 86 percent between 1989 and 1992.374 By 1993, Cuba’s economy had 
suffered so greatly that its total exports and imports decreased by 75 percent from 1989 
levels, and its GDP dropped by over one-third.375   
B. CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN-CUBAN TIES 
Russian-Cuban ties remained distant in the early to mid-1990s. Bain recounts that 
“Moscow voted against Havana in the UN Convention on Human Rights in Geneva from 
1992 to 1994, which was truly historic because the Kremlin had never previously done 
so.”376 Moreover, when the UN voted in 1992 to urge the United States to end its three-
decade embargo against Cuba, Moscow abstained from voting.377 Bain says, “The 
importance Moscow attached to relations with Washington negated a close relationship 
with Havana, given the continued strained nature of Cuban relations.”378 At the same 
time, economic ties remained strained. As Russia undertook a transition to neoliberal 
economics in the early 1990s, Russian companies that had previously traded with Cuba 
stopped doing because “they simply were not in a position to trade with the island due to 
the gravity of the economic situation facing Russia.”379  
Nonetheless, by 1995, Russia began making minor in-roads again with Cuba. At 
the 1995 UN Convention on Human Rights, Russia returned to voting in Cuba’s favor, 
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which ostensibly kept Russia itself from being condemned for its own abuses in 
Chechnya that year.380 That same year, for the first time since the Cold War, a Vishnya-
class Russian intelligence collection ship made a port call at Cienfuegos, Cuba, to 
resupply while out on a three-month mission along the U.S. East Coast. Subsequently, in 
October 1995, the Russians initiated an upgrade to their capabilities at the Lourdes 
SIGINT site, which they had kept open despite the dissolution of the Soviet Union.381  
Then, in 1996, Russia made its first real post-Cold War attempt at reaching out to 
Cuba, which was one of seven countries that then-Foreign Minister Primakov visited 
during his tour to regain relations with the region.382 Nonetheless, Sánchez Ramírez 
indicates that “there was an attempt to reestablish the traditional bilateral ties, but the 
results were more symbolic than real, and the advance was in political matters rather than 
economic-commercial ones. Moreover, Cuba's external debt with Russia limited the 
advance of the negotiations.”383 Yet, Russian companies did resume doing business with 
Cuba in the mid-1990s, and in 1996, Russia again became Cuba’s top trading partner, 
despite their trade totaling merely about 600,000 pesos that year—a fraction of a fraction 
of the trade between the Soviet Union and Cuba during the Cold War.384 Bain highlights, 
however, that Russia’s commercial “interest in Cuba at this time was not repeated with 
the rest of Latin America. Other countries, most noticeably China and Venezuela, may 
have subsequently overtaken Russia in importance in the Cuban economy, but this does 
not reduce the significance of Russian interest in the Cuban economy being stimulated by 
the desire to right the wrongs of the past.”385 Nonetheless, for at least most of the 
millennial decade, Cuban government resentment of Soviet abandonment and 
apprehension of the Russians would seemingly limit their ties, as discussed in the 
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following section.386 Cuban-Russian political ties have seemingly grown closer in the 
past seven years, while security and economic ties remain modest. 
1. Political Ties 
In December 2000, newly elected President Putin paid a four-day visit to Havana. 
This visit was significant in that it was only the third visit by a Soviet or Russian head of 
state since Cuba and the Soviet Union developed relations. Brezhnev had visited in 1974 
and Gorbachev in 1989.387 Yet, while the event was celebrated, Putin reportedly stated 
during the visit “that he did not travel to this former bastion of the cold war to recreate a 
‘union’ with Cuba against the United States, but rather to clean up the economic ‘mess’ 
left over from the Soviet era.”388 Putin reportedly celebrated the renewed amity between 
the two countries and bemoaned that the abandonment that Cuba had to endure as a result 
of Russia’s departure from the island after the Soviet Union collapsed.389 As detailed in 
the following subsections, those conciliatory sentiments were short-lived; yet, Russia 
would make political in-roads with Cuba again by the end of the millennial decade.  
a. Relations through 2008 Limited by Resentment 
Even before Putin ascended to the presidency, according to Mark Katz, “Castro 
deeply resented the cutoff in aid to Cuba undertaken by Mikhail Gorbachev and not 
reversed by Boris Yeltsin. Moscow, for its part, was unhappy that Cuba had not yet 
agreed to repay any of the debt it owed from the Soviet era.”390 In an act reminiscent of 
the Soviets’ betrayal and abandonment of Cuba in 1962 and 1991, in 2001—the year 
after Putin’s landmark visit—Russia decided to close down the Lourdes site and thus 
remove the only remaining Russian military unit permanently stationed on the island. 
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Russian leaders cited fiscal reasons for the closure.391 Some Russian elites opposed the 
closure, saying it was worth paying $200 million every year to the Castro regime to keep 
the site and that Putin appeared as if he were kowtowing to U.S. demands for its 
closure.392 Yet, “Putin’s defenders argued that spending the $200 million per year on spy 
satellites would yield richer intelligence, and maintained that American pressure had not 
influenced his decision.”393 The irritated Cubans contended that $200 million of savings 
equaled only a small fraction of the money that Cuba lost due to the Soviet Union’s 
collapse.394 At the same time, Russia began pressuring Cuba to pay back the money that 
it had borrowed from the Soviet Union during the Cold War.395 Cuba denied that it owed 
anything to Russia and rejected the latter’s prescription of working with the Paris Club to 
restructure the debt.396 Meanwhile, then-Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stressed to Cuba 
that their “bilateral relations would be based upon ‘the realities’ of each country and the 
competitive rules of the international trading system” and thus that Russia would not be 
subsidizing its trade with Cuba.397 
Despite these setbacks, the two countries did maintain some limited political ties 
in the years after the closure of Lourdes in 2001. For instance, in 2002 and 2003, Russian 
Duma delegations visited Cuba, and the two countries’ foreign ministers Felipe Pérez 
Roque and Igor Ivanov each visited the other’s capital in 2003.398 Pérez Roque and 
Ivanov signed an agreement that year that “committed themselves to common efforts on 
the international arena aiming at establishing a more just and democratic order of the 
world….Both states agreed in their negative evaluation of growing unilateralism in the 
U.S. political activities concerning security and war on terrorism.”399 Moreover, they 
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denounced the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (i.e., Helms–Burton) Act—
which had intensified the U.S. embargo—as a unilateral action by the United States.400 
Bain similarly notes that the two countries’ mutual aversion to political uni-polarity after 
the Cold War was vital to improving relations between them.401 
Nonetheless, Cuba remained resentful of Russia, as shown in its dealings with 
Russia over the next few years. In 2004, it reportedly would not allow Russia to remove 
some of the advanced equipment from Lourdes because Russia supposedly still owed it 
money.402 Then, the two had a controversy in 2008, when Putin ostensibly attempted to 
use the façade of a resumption of military ties with Cuba to exasperate the United States 
ahead of the Georgia conflict. Putin reportedly insinuated to Russia’s military leaders that 
it should open an air base on Cuba and then had then-Deputy Prime Minister Sechin and 
Security Council Secretary Patrushev visit Cuba to confer about restarting their bilateral 
security ties.403 Yet, a displeased “Cuba refused to bite because these plans were publicly 
announced without consulting it in advance….Fidel Castro publicly praised Raúl Castro’s 
restraint in refusing to be provoked by Moscow or by the U.S. Air Force chief of 
staff…who said that such a base would be crossing a red line.”404 Moreover, while Cuba 
supported Russia’s campaign in Georgia, it sided with the international community in not 
offering diplomatic recognition to the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, as Russia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela did do.405 Ellis says, “Cuba’s embrace of 
Russia’s re-engagement with the region in 2008 was subtly less enthusiastic than that by 
Venezuela and Nicaragua, arguably reflecting lingering resentment” resulting from the 
Russians’ swift withdrawal as the Soviet Union was dissolving.406 Ellis attributes that 
resentment to the economic hardship that Cuba had to endure after the Russians 
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withdrew.407 Yet, Negroponte offers, “Fidel recognized that his Soviet supporters were 
unable to maintain the annual subsidy, but he did not wish to lose a relationship that had 
given him leverage throughout the hemisphere.”408 
b. Mutual Visits and Political Support Increase 
Nonetheless, Russia’s reengagement with Cuba did continue and has increased in 
recent years. The turning point seems to have taken place in November 2008, when 
Russia’s then-President Medvedev visited Havana, followed by a visit to Moscow by 
Cuban President Raúl Castro in January 2009—a first for a Cuban president since Fidel’s 
visit there about 25 years before.409 Medvedev’s visit primarily entailed exploring 
possible investment deals for Russian national companies in energy, transportation, and 
other sectors. Castro’s visit entailed the presidents signing a number of memoranda 
including one regarding strategic engagement.410 
Since then, further high-level engagements and mutual political support have 
ensued. In 2010, during Foreign Minister Lavrov’s stop in Havana on his Latin America 
tour, the two sides conferred on not only economic infrastructure but also decided to 
resume their “strategic partnership,” by which Cuba and Russia would support each other 
at the UN and at other forums.411 Like Nicaragua, Cuba was one of only 11 countries to 
vote against the March 2014 UN resolution affirming the sovereignty of Ukraine.412 
Moreover, Cuba was one of Lavrov’s few stops on his tour in the region the following 
month—in part to propose a Russia-CELAC visa-free travel agreement.413 In 2013, Raúl 
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Castro had held the presidency of CELAC414; thus, like Nicaragua, Cuba has been 
important to Russia’s outreach to the region. Furthermore, President Putin visited Cuba 
during his July 2014 visit to the region for the BRICS summit; again, the visit ostensibly 
showed that Russia is not cut off from international relations despite its involvement in 
Crimea and Ukraine.415 At that time, Putin wrote off 90% of the $32 billion that Cuba 
has ostensibly owed since the Cold War, while payments on the remainder are to finance 
Russian investment ventures on the island.416 As such, Mary O’Grady writes, “It seems 
that the world's most notorious moochers are willing to forgive—for the right price. With 
sugar-daddy Venezuela running into economic problems in recent years and Mr. Putin 
itching for a place in the Caribbean sun, Cuba has decided to deal.”417 Thereafter, Cuban 
political support to Russia continued. In a September 2015 speech at the UN, President 
Castro spoke out against Western sanctions on Russia, as well as NATO’s expanded 
military force presence closer to Russia.418  
Meanwhile, Russia backs Cuba politically as well. For instance, in October 2015, 
Russia again spoke out against the U.S. embargo against Cuba in a speech to the UN 
General Assembly.419 With regard to ongoing U.S.-Cuban rapprochement, “Russian 
officials publicly welcomed the improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations, although the 
change in U.S. policy could be viewed as a potential setback for Russian overtures in the 
region.”420 As the normalization discussions commenced in January 2015, Russia had an 
intelligence collection ship in port at Havana.421 Nevertheless, when Lavrov visited not 
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only Nicaragua but also Cuba when he came to attend the SICA meeting in March 2015, 
“he expressed complete confidence that nothing would break the old ties between 
Moscow and Havana.”422 In contrast, Ellis argues that Cuban resentment is still a factor, 
saying that “the Cubans, who felt a lingering bitterness over the suffering inflicted on 
them when Russia abruptly cut off its economic aid at the end of the Cold War, now held 
Russia at arms-length and kept a relatively low profile, hoping to escape from under the 
50-year old U.S. sanctions regime.”423 
Whether the Castro regime and Cuban people still resent Russian abandonment, 
one factor may affect the future of Cuban-Russian relations—the Cuban leadership 
transition coming up in 2018. At the start of his current term in 2013, Raúl Castro 
broadcast that he did not desire to continue as president for the term starting in 2018.424 
Thus, unlike in Nicaragua where Russia has a seemingly perpetual ally in President 
Ortega, the approaching leadership transition in Cuba could change Cuban-Russian 
relations to some extent. Then again, Raúl has been hastily grooming the next 
generation—born after 1959—of presidential hopefuls in the ranks of the bureaucracy. 
They include Raúl’s children; the current first vice-president of the Council of State, 
Miguel Díaz-Canel; and Gerardo Hernández Nordelo, who was recently released from a 
U.S. prison after serving time on espionage charges.425 
2. Security Ties 
Although Cuba and Russia have since 2008 redeveloped political ties similar to 
their political ties during the halcyon days of their relationship in the 1970s and most of 
the 1980s, there is no strong indication that the two countries have revived their military 
ties since 2008. Certainly, the limited security-related engagements between them in this 
millennium have not come remotely close to the military ties that the Soviet Union and 
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Cuba had—with their joint operations, sales of mass quantities of advanced military 
hardware to Cuba, Soviet troops and advisers stationed in Cuba, and the introduction of 
nuclear weapons to the island. The following subsections discuss current military ties 
between the two countries. 
a. Limited Naval Deployments 
The Russian navy has made some port calls in Cuba, but the frequency of combat 
vessel visits is very minor compared to the presence of the Soviet navy in Cuba in the 
past. When the aforementioned Russian surface action group deployed to the Caribbean 
in 2008—a first for the Russian navy since 1988—the Admiral Chabanenko visited Cuba 
for four days after departing Nicaragua.426 Cuba’s navy did not take part in the exercise 
that the Venezuelan navy conducted with the Russian flotilla during that deployment. 
Years later, in September 2013, two Russian navy vessels on an out-of-area patrol again 
visited Cuba and then went on to Nicaragua as mentioned.427 Moreover, Russian 
intelligence collection ships have made periodic pit stops in Cuba over the years. As 
mentioned, in 1995, a Vishnya-class Russian intelligence collection ship made a port call 
at Cienfuegos, Cuba, to resupply while conducting its three-month mission.428 In recent 
years, the Viktor Leonov Vishnya-class collection ship has made port calls in Havana 
during some moments of political tension between Russia and the United States. The ship 
visited Havana on the very same day in February 2014 that Shoigu proclaimed Russia’s 
aforementioned ostensible plans for bases in Cuba and other countries, as tensions were 
high over the Ukraine crisis.429 Moreover, as noted previously, as U.S.-Cuban 
normalization discussions commenced in January 2015, Russia had the Viktor Leonov in 
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port at Havana.430 According to the press, however, “The Pentagon said that it tracks the 
Viktor Leonov all the time and that there is nothing to worry about.”431 
While Russian navy vessels have stopped in at Cuba occasionally, Russia’s 
military aircraft apparently have not. When two Russian Tu-160 strategic bombers made 
their aforementioned long-range patrol to the Caribbean in 2008, they did not land in 
Cuba, as they did in Venezuela.432 In 2009, Russian leaders were reportedly considering 
deploying such bombers to Cuba while on their long-range patrols.433 The talks did not 
materialize; when another pair of Tu-160s flew to the Caribbean in 2013, they again did 
not land in Cuba but instead landed in both Venezuela and Nicaragua.434 
Speaking of dubious Russian military plans involving Cuba, in a February 2015 
meeting, the chief of the General Staff of Russia’s military stated that Russia was 
conducting initial talks with Cuba, Brazil, Vietnam, and North Korea to hold joint 
exercises together.435 The likelihood of such exercises taking place may be about the 
same as the likelihood of Cuba actually—versus fictitiously—deploying troops to Syria 
to assist President Assad’s government alongside the Russian military. Gone are the days 
when Cuba deployed forces overseas in joint operations with the Russians.436 
b. Russia Unlikely to Have Bases in Cuba 
Besides Putin’s aforementioned disingenuous 2008 insinuations of having 
airbases in Cuba and the 2009 discussion by Russian leaders on possibly landing 
deployed bombers there, Russian leadership discussion of base access occurred again in 
                                                 
430 Jim Avila and Serena Marshall, “Russian Spy Ship’s Arrival in Cuba Raises Eyebrows,” ABC 
News, January 21, 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/International/russian-spy-ships-arrival-cuba-raises-
eyebrows/story?id=28377558. 
431 Ibid. 
432 Felgenhauer, “Russian Strategic Bombers Touch Down.” 
433 Sánchez, “Russia and Latin America at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century,” 371. 
434 Felgenhauer, “Russian Strategic Bombers Touch Down.” 
435 Damien Sharkov, “Russia Plans Joint Military Drills with North Korea and Cuba,” Newsweek, 
February 2, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/russia-plans-joint-military-drills-north-korea-and-cuba-
303836. 
436 Daniel Trotta, “Cuba Denies It Has Sent Troops to Syria to Help Assad,” Reuters, October 17, 
2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-cuba-idUSKCN0SC00D20151018. 
 75 
2014 and 2015, as mentioned.437 In February 2015, the Russian deputy defense minister 
clarified that Russia did not seek actual military bases but rather a set of locations for 
resupply, maintenance, and crew rest for its ships and aircraft.438 Then, in October 2015, 
a high-level Russian foreign ministry official reiterated that Russia had no plans of 
establishing a military base in Cuba.439 Whether Russia truly seeks only base access, or 
rather actual bases of its own, its aims have not apparently materialized, save the few 
aforementioned naval deployments. Ellis highlights that “although Russia had previously 
mentioned its interest in base access agreements with Venezuela and Cuba, the only such 
accord to materialize when Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited the region in 
February 2015 was a relatively minor deal with Nicaragua.”440 Sánchez mentions that if 
Cuba were to allow Russia to have a military base, it would be tremendously detrimental 
to Havana’s efforts to improve its ties with Washington.441 
Meanwhile, press reports released after President Putin’s visit to Havana in 2014 
rumored that the Lourdes SIGINT site would reopen. Putin refuted the reports.442 While 
the Lourdes site may not reopen, an endeavor that could actually proceed is the 
establishment of a satellite control station in Cuba for Russia’s GLONASS. During 
Putin’s 2014 visit, he did reportedly argue for a GLONASS station not only in Nicaragua 
but also in Cuba, as well as in the other countries he visited.443 
c. Apparent Lack of Counter-Narcotics Cooperation 
According to Katarzyna Krzywicka, in the aforementioned March 2003 meeting 
between Cuba and Russia’s foreign ministers, the two sides “committed themselves to 
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fight international terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational crime.”444 Nearly a 
decade later, in 2012, Russian FSKN director, Viktor Ivanov visited Cuba during his 
aforementioned tour to solicit cooperation in countering illicit drug trafficking.445 While 
Russia has been quite involved in counter-narcotics cooperation with Nicaragua as 
detailed in the previous chapter, it has apparently not done so with Cuba, which may not 
need the help. Per the U.S. State Department’s 2015 International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report, “Cuba dedicates significant resources to prevent illegal drugs and their 
use from spreading, and regional traffickers typically avoid Cuba.”446 Nevertheless, 
Cuban authorities do conduct counterdrug cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard; the 
two sides share tactical intelligence that has assisted with a number of interdictions.447 
d. Some Military Equipment Refurbishment 
In stark contrast to the vast quantities of military equipment that Cuba imported 
from the Soviets during the Cold War, it has reportedly not received any military systems 
from Russia since the Cold War ended due to resource constraints. Reportedly, however, 
Cuba has ordered for its existing MiG fighters an unknown number of AA-11 air-to-air 
missiles that were to have arrived by December 2015.448 According to Jane’s, “this 
procurement is the first public announcement of its sort in a long time as Cuba is very 
well known for its secrecy. Its last shipment of air-to-air missiles dates back to 1985.”449  
Due to the dearth of new systems, refurbishment and local production have been 
essential for the maintenance of Cuba’s Soviet-era equipment over the years. Russia has 
reportedly assisted with upgrading Cuba’s existing air defense equipment, particularly its 
SAM systems and ground-based radars.450 Indeed, when a high-level Russian military 
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delegation visited the island in October 2008 for the first time since the closure of 
Lourdes in 2002, the visit pertained merely to technical matters related to Cuba’s Soviet-
made SAM systems.451 In recent years, Cuba has resorted to skirting the UN ban on 
transferring weapons to North Korea, ostensibly to upgrade its equipment. In 2013, Cuba 
attempted shipping two of its MiG-21s, 15 MiG-21 engines, and SAM system 
components to North Korea, supposedly to have them serviced there and then sent back 
to Cuba. Panamanian authorities interdicted the shipment.452 
3. Economic Ties 
As mentioned, by 1992, all economic aid that Cuba had been previously receiving 
from the Soviet Union dried up.453 Thereafter, Russia would never again have remotely 
as close of economic ties with Cuba as the Soviet Union did. Showing the contrast, 
Negroponte indicates that “whereas over the previous 33 years the Soviet Union could 
subsidize the Cuban economy with oil, trucks, tourists and military hardware to the tune 
of $4–5 billion a year, Russia after 1992 did not have the cash to maintain its economic 
support to the island.”454 Nonetheless, Cuba’s economy grew over the rest of the decade, 
“as Cuba moved forward with some limited market-oriented economic reforms.”455 In 
the mid-2000s, Cuba’s economy grew particularly stronger, with 11% growth in 2005 
and 12% in 2006 and came to benefit from economic ties with Venezuela and China.456 
In light of the dearth of oil imports from Russia, the Castro regime came to rely on oil 
imports from Venezuela via Hugo Chávez’s Petrocaribe subsidized oil program.457 Since 
the late 1990s, Cuban-Russian economic ties have entailed relatively insignificant 
commerce, seemingly little aid to Cuba but some financing, and energy projects that have 
yet to produce results. The most significant aspect of their economic ties seems to be the 
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restructurings of Cuba’s debts and the civilian aircraft deals seemingly linked to the 
restructurings.458 
a. Comparatively Insignificant Commerce, Limited Aid 
As noted earlier, in the mid-1990s, Russian companies made in-roads with 
resuming trade with Cuba, and Russia even became Cuba’s top trading partner once again 
in 1996. Nonetheless, their trade remained miniscule compared to Soviet-Cuban trade.459 
After that post-Cold War peak in 1996, their bilateral trade began to drop off 
significantly, as depicted in Figures 3 and 4. The marked decline may have resulted from 
the recession affecting Russia in the late 1990s, as well as the aforementioned political 
fallout between Russia and Cuba after the closure of Lourdes. Russia’s top export to 
Cuba in the peak year of 1996 was oil, but its oil exports to the island plummeted 
thereafter. Likewise, whereas Cuba’s sugar exports to Russia soared in 2001, by 2002 
they were on a steep decline. Since then, Cuba’s exports to Russia have remained 
relatively low. Cuban imports from Russia did resurge during Cuba’s aforementioned 
period of high growth in the mid-2000s and during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 
and 2009. Major imports in those years included vehicle parts including engines and tires, 
especially for public service or commercial vehicles; aircraft; boiler parts; and electrical 
equipment. Finally, as was the case for Nicaragua, Cuba’s imports from Russia have 
experienced a marked decline since 2014.460 While significantly lower in total value in 
2014, Cuba’s top imports from Russia continued to include machinery, engines, and other 
vehicle parts, as well as aircraft. Likewise, while much lower in quantity than in the past, 
sugar remained Cuba’s top export to Russia.461 
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Figure 3.  Cuban Imports from Russia 
 
Source: “UN Comtrade,” UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, accessed 
March 12, 2016, http://comtrade.un.org/data/. 
Figure 4.  Cuban Exports to Russia 
 
Source: “UN Comtrade,” UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, accessed 
March 12, 2016, http://comtrade.un.org/data/. 
Due to its economic losses after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Cuba had to 
diversify its commercial partners. Venezuela, China, Canada, and Spain among others 
have become major economic partners of the island country.462 In 2014, Cuba imported 
about $3.5 billion of goods from and exported about $1 billion of goods to Venezuela—
about 27 times the value of overall trade that Cuba did with Russia that year. Even the 
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United States exported about three times the value of goods to Cuba that Russia did in 
2014. In fact, U.S. exports to Cuba have been greater in value than Russia’s every year 
since 2002.463 The U.S. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) 
of 2000 has permitted U.S. farmers to export agricultural products to Cuba; in 2014, the 
top U.S. exports to Cuba were poultry and soybeans.464 
While commercial links between Cuba and Russia have been miniscule in 
comparison with the ubiquity of the Soviet Union in Cuba’s economy for most of their 
Cold-War relationship, so has Russian aid to Cuba apparently been limited. Reportedly, 
during Raúl Castro’s visit to Moscow in 2009, he and Medvedev signed an accord 
regarding food aid.465 Then, in 2010, Russia reportedly did donate 100,000 tons of wheat 
and other aid to Cuba to help it recover from hurricanes that struck the island in 2008.466 
While the literature has not revealed any other instances of free aid from Russia to Cuba 
this millennium, Russia has offered Cuba loans, such as a $150 million loan in 2009 for it 
to be able to buy machinery for construction and agriculture.467 Altogether, Russia’s 
limited trade with and aid to Cuba support Blank’s assertion that “Russia will only 
partially, if at all, meet Latin American expectations for support, even in stricken 
economies like Cuba.”468  
b. Energy Projects sans Results 
Meanwhile, Russia has invested in some energy-related projects in Cuba, but they 
have thus far not produced any results. First is the two-reactor nuclear power plant that 
the Soviets had started building in Cienfuegos Province, Cuba, in 1983. Construction 
halted in 1992 when the Soviet assistance writ large dried up. Due to a lack of financing 
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the project failed to restart; nonetheless, the Russians still desired to proceed with the 
project in the 1990s until Fidel Castro finally told Putin during his 2000 visit to the island 
that Cuba had lost interest.469 More recently, three Russian companies have invested in 
oil exploration projects in the waters of Cuba’s exclusive economic zone, with no success 
to date. Mark Sullivan says, “Gazprom had been in a partnership with the Malaysian state 
oil company Petronas that conducted unsuccessful deepwater oil drilling off of Cuba’s 
western coast in 2012. The Russian oil company Zarubezhneft began drilling in Cuba’s 
shallow coastal waters east of Havana in December 2012, but stopped work in April 2013 
because of disappointing results.”470 Then, in 2014, Russia’s Rosneft and Zarubezhneft 
signed on with Cuba’s state-owned CubaPetroleo to develop another offshore area.471 As 
may be the case with any attempts at such projects in Nicaragua, it may be that ongoing 
low oil prices and economic sanctions from the West will inhibit the Russian companies’ 
financing for this project.472 Finally, in October 2015, the Russian government reportedly 
offered Cuba a 1.2 billion euro credit to finance the construction of generating units at 
two existing thermal power plants in Cuba.473 This project shows that, despite Russia’s 
ongoing economic plight, it has extended some assistance to Cuba. It will be worth noting 
how those two projects unfold if they do indeed come to fruition. 
c. Debt Restructurings and Civilian Aircraft Deals 
Debt restructurings and civilian aircraft deals may be the most significant aspects 
of Cuban-Russian economic ties today. Russia’s restructuring of Cuba’s debts to it may 
seem magnanimous on Russia’s part, but such write-offs seemingly have been linked 
with Cuba’s subsequent acquisition of Russian civilian aircraft.474 According to 
Negroponte, “Russian restructuring of Cuban debt became a regular fixture until 2014. A 
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percentage of the debt is restructured AND [sic] Cuba buys or leases Russian aircraft. 
The value of the sale or lease agreement often approaches the amount of restructured 
interest due!”475 She goes on to highlight that after Russia restructured $166 million of 
Cuba’s debt in 2004, Cuba subsequently leased two Ilyushin aircraft for $110 million. 
Likewise, in 2006, Cuba was able to buy five aircraft—three Tupolev and two Ilyushin—
on a Russia-backed export guarantee.476 Finally, regarding the aforementioned recent 
write-off of about 90 percent of Cuba’s $32 billion of supposed debt to Russia, 
Negroponte mentions, “both governments have sought to resolve the debt issue so that 
the Cuban government could lease 8 more Russian jets, valued at $650 million.”477 
C. CONCLUSION 
Contrasts are drastically apparent between Soviet-Cuban ties during their halcyon 
days of the 1970s and 1980s and Russian-Cuban ties in the contemporary era. While the 
Castro regime and the Soviets experienced six years of tumultuous ties in the 1960s, they 
reconciled and became politically close, and the Soviets became ubiquitous in Cuban 
political, military, and economic affairs. As with Cuban resentment due to the outcome of 
the Missile Crisis negotiations, the Castro regime resented Russian abandonment after the 
Cold War came to a close and again in the early 2000s with the closing of Lourdes and 
other setbacks in their bilateral ties. Yet, as in 1968, political reconciliation seemingly 
occurred again in late 2008. Since then, Cuba and Russia have provided each other 
political support reminiscent of their political ties from 1968 until the late 1980s.  
Yet, in contrast, Cuba and Russia have not developed all-encompassing security 
and economic ties, both of which remain quite modest. Russia has not provided massive 
quantities of advanced weapon systems and training to the Cuban military, maintained a 
military contingent on the island, and conducted joint military operations with the Cuban 
military as the Soviets did—not to mention the Soviet placement of nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles on the island. Russian-Cuban security ties today have mostly entailed 
                                                 




sporadic naval vessel port calls and some equipment refurbishing. At the same time, the 
Russians have not been omnipresent in the organization and activities of Cuba’s 
bureaucracy and economy as the Soviets were. Today, trade and aid have been relatively 
insignificant. Russian loans, energy project investments, and especially debt 
restructurings and aircraft deals have given their economic relationship some substance. 
The major debt restructuring in 2014 may show that Russia desires to deepen their ties. 
Nonetheless, overall, one cannot say that the Soviet “bear”—defined by not only deep 
political ties but also a significant military presence in and deep economic ties with 
Cuba—has returned to Cuba. Meanwhile, as noted in the previous chapter, Russia’s ties 
with Nicaragua today are arguably closer than its ties with Cuba due to Russia’s 
seemingly deeper security-related engagement with Nicaragua in recent years. Cuban 
resentment is not necessarily the root of Cuban-Russian ties being seemingly lesser in 
depth than Nicaraguan-Russian ties because Cuban resentment seemingly diminished to 
some extent in late 2008 to early 2009. These findings have implications for U.S. policy, 
which Chapter IV will address. 
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A. ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTHESES 
The case studies of Nicaragua and Cuba support hypothesis 1 of this thesis that 
engagement between contemporary Russia and former Soviet allies in Latin America 
does not represent a return of the Soviet “bear” to the U.S. periphery. While Ortega-led 
Nicaragua and the Castro regime in Cuba have become close with Russia politically since 
2008 and have each received limited economic and security support from Russia, neither 
regime has developed military or economic ties with Russia nearly to the extent to which 
they did with the Soviet Union. Cuban-Russian engagement today does not involve 
Russia providing vast amounts of advanced weapon systems and training to the Cuban 
military, maintaining a military contingent on the island, conducting joint military 
operations with the Cubans, or placing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles on the 
island as the Soviets did. Nor does it today entail Russia being omnipresent in Cuba’s 
bureaucracy and economy as the Soviet Union was. Likewise, Nicaraguan-Russian 
engagement today does not involve Russia providing extensive military and economic 
support to undergird the FSLN regime against U.S. efforts to undermine it—as the 
Soviets did in the 1980s. As the sun was setting on the Soviet Union, “Marxism-Leninism 
was completely removed from Moscow's foreign policy.”478 As such, Russian 
engagement in Latin America today “is not a return to the proxy fights of the Cold War, 
but instead indicates Russian outreach in the search for markets and friends...who can buy 
their hardware, enter into joint ventures on energy products and provide votes in Russia’s 
favor at the UN General Assembly.”479 
Cuba and Nicaragua are two of those “friends.” While military and economic ties 
between those two and Russia have been relatively narrow, they have since 2008 
provided political support to Russia against U.S. interests and permitted sporadic Russian 
military deployments—most significantly the Tu-160s that landed in Nicaragua in 
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October 2013. Those manifestations of their renewed relations seemingly support that 
Russian engagement in the region today is mostly for the geopolitical purpose of 
challenging U.S. global hegemony—including demonstrating displeasure with 
U.S./NATO military activities in Russia’s periphery—rather than an interest in the affairs 
of the Latin American states themselves.480 At the same time, Russia’s aforementioned 
training center in Managua could additionally be an effort “to displace U.S. counter-
narcotics efforts in the hemisphere,” as Farah has posited.481 In the early 2000s—except 
for a period after the September 11, 2001 attacks—Putin’s administration embraced a 
confrontational foreign policy approach against what it had come to view as U.S. political 
aggressiveness toward achieving global hegemony.482 Then, during Putin’s 2004–2008 
presidential term, his government’s foreign policy approach emphasized maintaining 
Russia’s sovereignty by keeping the West out of Russia’s historic periphery, after the 
Baltic states joined NATO in 2004 and allowed it to use former Soviet bases.483 Since 
Russia’s reengagement with Cuba and Nicaragua in 2008 took off in the context of 
Russia’s periphery-centric foreign policy approach, the reengagement clearly would not 
entail Russia bolstering the Cuban and Nicaraguan regimes, as in the Cold War. Rather, it 
entailed those former Soviet allies supporting Russia in its own political and sovereignty 
struggle with the West. The reengagement is reminiscent of Cuba’s early-1960s criticism 
of the Soviets as having been only concerned with the national security of the Soviet 
Union itself.484 Nonetheless, as noted in the two case studies, Russia has rewarded 
Nicaragua and Cuba’s geopolitical support with some political, security-related, and 
economic support. 
In support of hypothesis 2, while Russian economic and security-related support 
to the former Soviet allies in Latin America has been relatively narrow and Russian 
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deployments and basing talks seem fleeting, certain limited aspects of their ties may 
portend enduring, versus ephemeral, ties between them. For instance, the extent of 
Nicaraguan-Russian counter-narcotics cooperation may portend an enduring Russian 
presence in Nicaragua, especially in light of the newly constructed training center in 
Managua. Likewise, Russia’s relief of the vast majority of Cuba’s purported Soviet-era 
debt could portend enduring and deepening economic ties between the two old allies in 
the future. Such activities do not represent a near-term threat to the United States, but 
Russian activities in the Western Hemisphere are of concern and thus require 
monitoring.485 
Meanwhile, this thesis has only partly supported hypothesis 3 that Russia’s ties 
with Nicaragua today are greater than its ties with Cuba due to Cuban resentment of 
Russian abandonment. Indeed, Cuban resentment seemingly was a roadblock in Russia’s 
path toward reengaging with Cuba in the post-Cold War era.486 Yet, while Nicaraguan-
Russian ties today are arguably closer than Cuban-Russian ties due to deeper Nicaraguan-
Russian security engagement in recent years, Cuban resentment seemingly diminished in 
late 2008 to early 2009; evidence of that amelioration can be found in the uptick in 
Cuban-Russian political engagements, mutual political support, energy project attempts, 
and the 2014 major restructuring of Cuba’s debt. Thus, this thesis does not support the 
underlying reasoning of hypothesis 3—that Cuba’s resentment has made it less close with 
Russia than Nicaragua is. 
Finally, the findings of this thesis do support hypothesis 4—that Russia’s 
economic ties with Nicaragua and Cuba have declined since 2014 due to such factors as 
the downturn of the oil market and the economic sanctions against Russia. Indeed, as 
noted in Chapter II, while Nicaraguan-Russian trade and Russian aid to Nicaragua 
increased after 2008, they decreased in 2014, and investment projects have remained 
tenuous. Meanwhile, as covered in Chapter III, Cuban-Russian trade also had a marked 
downturn in 2014, and it has yet to be seen whether current Russian energy investment 
plans in Cuba will come to fruition. Thus, this thesis supports the contention that low oil 
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prices and the sanctions against Russia since 2014 are likely to inhibit Russian financing 
for projects in Latin America.487 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
The most significant takeaway of these findings for U.S. policy is to not adopt a 
“red scare” mentality about Russia’s reengagement with former Soviet allies in Latin 
America. When policymakers read statements such as the following in journal articles, 
they should not be overly alarmed: “In Nicaragua and Cuba, Russia has attempted to 
reactivate political-military networks created during the Cold War.”488 Russia’s sporadic 
naval and strategic bomber deployments, talks with limited success to secure basing 
agreements, counter-narcotics cooperation with Nicaragua, limited economic ties with the 
region, and mutual votes counter to U.S. positions at the UN do not mean that Russia has 
relaunched the deep security and economic ties that the Soviet Union had with Cuba and 
Nicaragua. Russia has reengaged with its old allies to secure their support, but U.S. 
policymakers should understand the comparative limitedness of its ties with Cuba and 
Nicaragua today.  
Nonetheless, in agreement with General Kelly, Russia’s reengagement with 
Nicaragua, Cuba, and the region writ large does signify that the United States should 
continue engaging its partners in the region.489 Doing so could prevent further states from 
aligning politically with Russia and countering U.S. interests. Moreover, U.S. 
engagement with these former Soviet allies could soften their anti-U.S. political stance 
and perhaps serve to lessen their ties with Russia. Ongoing U.S.-Cuban rapprochement 
has not necessarily tempered the Castro regime’s political support of Russia, as 
evidenced by President Raúl Castro’s September 2015 speech at the UN, in which he 
spoke out against Western sanctions on Russia and NATO’s expanded military force 
presence closer to Russia.490 Nonetheless, as rapprochement continues, perhaps it will 
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moderate Castro’s political stance vis-à-vis Russia—or the stance of his replacement after 
the 2018 leadership transition in Cuba. Moreover, as with Cuba, perhaps rapprochement 
with the Ortega regime in Nicaragua is possible and desirable as a way to limit Russia’s 
foothold there. Yet, if the U.S. government wishes to attempt political reconciliation with 
Ortega—who may remain in power for a long time—it may be easier to do under a 
Democratic president, namely by President Obama before his current term ends. 
According to Héctor Perla, Jr. and Héctor Cruz-Feliciano, Ortega has tempered his anti-
U.S. tone vis-à-vis President Obama, portraying him “as a victim of the rules of empire, 
hawkish advisers, and conservative bureaucrats who try to sabotage the administration 
from within.”491 Despite his anti-U.S. rhetoric, Ortega has shown that he is willing to 
work with the United States in the interest of practicality, notably by not withdrawing 
from the CAFTA-DR agreement with the United States, to which Nicaragua acceded 
under the Bolaños administration before Ortega’s return to power.492  
Besides political engagement with U.S. partners and the former Soviet allies in 
Latin America, the United States should further ties with them through security and 
developmental assistance, which in addition to mitigating socioeconomic and security 
problems, would help limit Russian influence in the region. In October 2015, Dr. 
Negroponte recommended to Congress: 
We should pass the billion-dollar program to support Central America. 
The underlying problems of the region are poverty and unequal 
distribution of wealth. If we are not to show that we care about these 
underlying problems exacerbated further by the drug trade, exacerbated 
further by the presence of military weapons, then we should expect that 
others will fill that space. I sincerely hope that space is not filled by 
Russia.493 
The Consolidated Appropriations Act that Congress approved and the President signed in 
December 2015 does not provide the proposed $1 billion but “provides ‘up to’ $750 
million to implement the new U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America in 
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support of the Alliance for Prosperity.”494 A small portion of the new funding will be for 
U.S. assistance to Nicaragua.495 Such new assistance, in addition to the existing U.S. 
counter-narcotics efforts with Nicaragua highlighted in Chapter II, could serve to 
diminish—to some extent—the importance of Russia’s counter-narcotics assistance to 
Nicaragua. 
Finally, an implication of the findings of this thesis is that if U.S. policymakers 
wish to limit Russia’s ability to expand its economic ties with former Soviet allies in 
Latin America, as well as with other countries in the region and beyond, then they should 
continue the current economic sanctions against Russia and endeavor to keep oil prices 
low. Meanwhile, the United States should strive to capitalize on its trade ties with Cuba 
and Nicaragua, to remain more economically important to those countries than Russia is. 
As the United States continues normalizing relations diplomatically with Cuba, it should 
consider promoting efforts to expand its economic ties—such as trade and remittances—
with Cuba as a means of furthering cooperation between the two countries.496 For 
instance, U.S. policymakers could promote the increase of U.S. agricultural exports to 
Cuba, which now imports roughly three-quarters of its food. U.S. agricultural exports to 
the island have decreased since a peak in 2008, while European and Brazilian competitors 
have made gains in the Cuban agricultural export market.497 
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